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AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF W. W. BOSTON'S




The purpose of this study is to examine empir­
ically several of the key statements in Professor W. W. 
Rostov;'s historical stages theory of economic develop­
ment. The present study differs from similar studies in 
the method and in the data it uses to examine these 
aspects of Rostov's theory.
In the past, the approach taken by Professor 
Simon Kuznets of Harvard University, and others, in 
empirically examining Rostov's historical stages theory 
vas to vork vith time series data for various countries 
covering long periods of time. This approach has the 
decided advantage of being the most straightforvard 
method of examining Rostov's theory, but it possesses 
three dravbacks: first, the necessary long-term time
series are available, vith the exception of Japan, for 
only a fev presently developed "Western" nations; second, 
such data seldom extend far enough back in time to cover
2
3
the emergence of these countries into Professor Rostow's 
crucial take-off stage; and, third, the data available 
for the earliest time periods--which are the most 
critical ones in terms of examining Professor Rostov's 
important take-off concept--are of limited reliability. 
Thus, Kuznets states that "the evidence . . .  is not 
conclusive," but it does not seem to "support Professor 
Rostov's distinction and characterization of the take­
off stage.
Although some difficulties are associated vith 
the empirical approach of the present study, the gen­
eral results obtained seem to cast additional light 
on Rostov's theory, and on his take-off stage in par­
ticular .
1
The Importance of Additional Work in This Area
A number of economists have made statements 
emphasizing the value of additional vork in this area. 
According to Professor Everett E. Hagen, "The concept 
of a succession of stages is useful only if each stage
is characterized by a set of empirically testable qual-
2ities. . . ' Similarly, Professor Kuznets, in discussing
^Simon Kuznets, Economic Grovth and Structure; 
Selected Essays (Nev York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1965), p. 232.
2Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: Hov Economic Grovth Begins (Homevood, Illinois
Dorsey Press, I967), p̂  514.
4
the characteristics of a good historical stages theory 
of economic development, says, "Any specific stage 
must display empirically testable characteristics, com­
mon to all or to an important group of units experi-
3encing modern economic growth."
Kuznets concluded his empirical study of Ros- 
tow's historical stages theory by saying, ". . . the 
evidence used to test Professor Rostov's scheme is 
not conclusive . . .  quantitative evidence, and much 
of it must be quantitative, is not available for some
4of the take-off periods suggested by Professor Rostov."
Professor Kant in, "Rostov's Take-Off: An
Appraisal," suggests that, ". . . an empirical approach
. . . vould have enabled us to make a better assessment."^
Scope
The present study consists of two major divi­
sions. The first is a survey of the literature sur­
rounding Professor Rostov's historical stages theory, 
vhich is intended as a background to shov vhere the pres­
ent study fits in relation to other vork in this area.
3Kuznets, p. 215.
4■Ibid. . pp. 219 and 232.
^M. Kant, "Rostov's Take-Off: An Appraisal,"
Indian Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIII (July, I962), 
p . 32.
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The second reports the procedure and results 
of the present empirical study. In this section pri­
mary emphasis is given to several of Professor Rostov's 
key statements concerning the take-off stage. Also 
included, but given less emphasis, is an examination 
of several other elements in Professor Rostov's theory.
Method of Approach
Rostov's take-off stage is generally understood 
to be a period of about tventy years. United Nations 
time series data are nov available for some of the 
countries in the vorld for a period of seventeen years, 
or the greater part of the time required for Professor 
Rostov's take-off stage to occur. The approach of the 
current study has been to use these nevly available 
United Nations data in examining Rostov's historical 
stages theory.
In general, the method used in the present 
study has been to carry out a time series analysis 
using these seventeen year spans (or shorter spans 
in some cases) of available data for the countries 
selected for examination. The sample countries vere 
ranked according to level of economic development, and 




The countries examined in this study consist, 
insofar as the availability of data permit, of those 
discussed iri, ''On the Measurement of Economic Devel­
opment Using Scalogram Analysis," by Magdi M. El- 
Kammash.^
In El-Kammash's article, 49 countries were
ranked according to level of economic development
based on four variables: l) infant mortality rates,
2) degree of illiteracy, 3) gross capital formation
as a percentage of gross national product in 1955? and
4) share of the agricultural sector (agriculture,
forestry and fishing) in gross domestic product in 
71955. Using these four variables, countries were
grouped into five successive categories of economic
development, "based on the total scores of scaling,"
the ordering of countries within each category being
based on per capita national product averaged over
o
the years 1952-1954.
According to United Nations population estimates
Magdi M. El-Kammash, "On the Measurement of 
Economic Development Using Scalogram Analysis," Papers 
and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association,




for 19671 El-Kammash's 49 country sample contains
approximately 53 percent of the world's population,
while the 46 of these countries examined in Chapter VI
and the 47 of these countries examined in Chapter VII
of the present study account for approximately 37
9percent of the world's population.
The Data
The primary source of data for the present study 
consisted of various issues of the United Nations Year­
book of National Accounts Statistics issued since 
World War II. Complete data for all the countries in 
the world were not available, but enough data were 
available to indicate general patterns for the majority 
of the countries in the world.
In general, "gross" national accounts data were 
used in the present study rather than "net" national 
accounts data because of greater reliability and avail­
ability.
Specific Points Examined
According to Rostow, two necessary requirements 
which must be fulfilled in order for the take-off stage
9 Calculated using data from. United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook, 1967 (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, I968).
8
to occur in a given country are the following:
*) a rise in the rate of productive investment 
from, say, 5% or less to over 10% of national 
income (or net national product (NNP)).
*) the existence or quick emergence of a poli­
tical, social and institutional framework 
which exploits the impulses to expansion 
in the modern sector and the potential 
external economy effects of the take-off 
and gives to growth an on-going character.
The first of these two statements may be 
interpreted as requiring a rapid (considering the 
briefness of the take-off stage) increase in invest­
ment as a percentage of national product for a nation's 
economy. The second statement, dealing with the 
"quick emergence of a political, social and institu­
tional framework which exploits the impulses to expan­
sion in the modern sector," is interpreted broadly in 
the present study. From the standpoint of economic 
theory, these factors constitute what might be called 
the "public goods" sector. The present study examines 
this concept by looking at the rate of increase in size 
of the government sector as a percentage of a nation's 
economy for each of the sample countries. Although 
available data for the government sector do not pre­
cisely encompass all of the factors making up the
Wk ¥. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1960), p. 39*
9
public goods sector, these data are the most readily 
available arid reliable, and are felt to be highly 
correlated with the concept being examined.
The present study examines the above two state­
ments by looking at trends for the sample countries in 
"Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a Percentage
I
of hross Domestic Product" and "Government Consumption 
Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product," 
respectively, over the seventeen year span. The 
hypothesis examined is that, in reference to the take­
off stage, a "cluster" of countries at the lower, less- 
developed end of Professor El-Kammash's ranking of 
countries will exhibit these two characteristics of 
Professor Rostow's take-off stage.
Another point examined is Professor Rostow's 
statement that, during the drive-to-maturity stage, 
"some 10-20% of the national income is steadily 
invested. . . This statement is examined by
analyzing the trend in "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product."
Finally, the present study follows a line of 
research suggested in Professor Kuznets' writings, by 
examining the rural and urban population aspects asso­
ciated with economic development for the sample coun­
tries examined in the present study.
^^Ibid.. p. 9.
PART II
PROFESSOR ROSTOW'S HISTORICAL STAGES THEORY 
AND PREVIOUS WORK EXAMINING IT
CHAPTER II
SUMMARY OF ¥. W. ROSTOW'S HISTORICAL STAGES 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
The version of Professor Rostow's historical
stages theory summarized here is the one presented in
his book, The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non-
Communist Manifesto.^ Although Professor Rostow's
theory exists in slightly differing versions in earlier
writings and journal articles, the version presented
in his book is of a more "mature" form and is perhaps
2the most widely disseminated version of this theory.
Professor Rostow is only one of a succession 
of people who have created historical stages theories 
of economic development. A range of historical stages 
theories can be found which go "back at least two
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth; 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge; Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, i960).
2See, for example: W. W. Rostow, "The Take-
Off into Self-Sustained Growth," Economic Journal. 
Vol. LXVI, No. 261 (March, 1956), pp. 25-48.
11
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centuries, even if no account is taken of the specula­
tions on the development from I lie 'natural state' so 
iirevalent in the writings during the whole Enlighten­
ment era and in amplified form presented by Adam Smith
' : : . 3in his Wealth of Nations."
The common aim of these theories is to design 
a model of the historical process of economic develop­
ment by specifying and isolating a limited number of
i ;factors which characterize and identify the different 
stages.
Such models are illuminating and justifiable if 
they identify genuine key variables and reveal 
otherwise unexpected relationships. Their suita­
bility for prediction is especially significant.
Most models implicitly or explicitly claim to 
explain or predict through postulated changes in 
the key variables. These changes are in turn 
derived either from ^  priori reasoning, or on 
the basis of empirical data. Without the speci­
fied changes, development from one stage to 
another will not occur, or will occur only 
exceptionally. If a model can successfully 
identify the key variables and significant changes 
in them, then a powerful tool of explanation and 
prediction will have been forged.
Professor Rostow's widely acclaimed book,
The Stages of Economic Growth, attempts to identify 
the key variables in the process of world economic 
history and the resulting stages of economic growth; 
and he claims that these both explain the course 
of economic history and yield predictions for the
3Gunnar Myrdal, "The Theories of 'Stages of 
Growth,"' Scandinavian Economic History Review. Vol. XV, 
Nos. 1 & 2 (1967), p. 2.
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future which in tui'ii can serve as bases for far- 
reaching policies,^
The novel feature of Professor Rostov's 
historical stages theory is "the notion that first 
there is a period when the conditions for growth are 
established, then one or two or three decades within 
which certain distinctive and necessary transitional 
events begin arid are completed, and thereafter self­
sustained continuing growth. An airplane leaves the 
ground in such a sequence. . . .
Previous Historical Stages Theories
"Historians and philosophers have for long 
been attracted by the possibility of expressing the 
historical process as a sequence of stages instead of 
a simple chronological arrangement."^ Adam Smith used 
a sequence of hunting, pastoral, agricultural, commer-
7cial, and manufacturing stages. Frederich List felt 
that each nation passes through five stages which he
UP. T. Bauer and Charles Wilson, "The Stages of 
Growth," Economica, New Series, Vol. 29 (May, I962),
p. 190.
^Everett E. Hagen, On the Theorv of Social 
Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illinois ;
Dorsey Press, I967), p. 516.
^Ibid.
7 Jacob Oser, The Evolution of Economic Thought 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, I963), p. 365.
ik
termed; original barbarism, pastoral condition, agri­
cultural condition, agricultural manufacturing condi­
tion, and agricultural manufacturing commercial condi- 
8t ion.
Karl Marx's famous pattern of stages had soci­
ety evolving "from primitive communism to slavery,
9feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism,"
Werner Sombart divided man's history into three stages 
depending on the degree of social interaction: the
individual economy, the transitional economy, and the
. , 10 social economy.
Bruno Hildebrand built on the ideas of Frederich 
List, feeling that List generalized too much from what 
had occurred in Britain.Hildebrand's scheme con­
sisted of: an exchange economy, a money economy, and
12a credit economy. Karl Bucher, a later economist, 
developed a view of historical economic development 
containing three stages in which he synthesized 
the ideas of many previous economists, such as
g
Alexander Gray, The Development of Economic 
Doctrine (New York: John Wiley & Sons , I965 ) , pi ^8.
^Oser, p. 365.
lOlbid.
11Stephen Enke, Economics for Development (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N; J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pT 193.
12Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analy­
sis (New York: Oxford University Press, I966 ), pTI 442,
15
13List and Hildebrand. "Bucher discussed in a series
of essays the evolution of the 'household economy' of
antiquity into the 'town economy' of the late Middle
Agés, and thereafter into the 'natural economy' of 
l4modern times."
Professor Rostov's Stages
In Professor Rostov's book, The Stages of Eco­
nomic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto, five stages- 
of-growth are presented as a means of generalizing the 
economic development of nations. Also, Professor 
Rostov contends that these stages-of-growth "consti­
tute an alternative to Karl Marx's theory of modern 
history.
According to Professor Rostov, it is possible 
to classify all societies, at least in their economic 
dimensions, as lying within one of the following five 
stages-of-growth categories: the "Traditional Soci­
ety," the "Preconditions for Take-Off," the "Take- 
Off," the "Drive to Maturity," and the "Age of High 
Mass-Consumption."
p . 2 ,
l^Enke, p. 193.' 
l4Bauer and Wilson, p. 190.
^^Rostov, The Stages of Economic Growth,
 ̂ 16
The Traditional Society
Professor Rostow's first stage, the "tradi­
tional society," serves chiefly as a base line for 
his other s t a g e s . A c c o r d i n g  to Professor Rostow,
"a traditional society is one whose structure is 
developed within limited production functions, based 
on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre- 
Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world, New­
ton is here used as a symbol for the watershed in
history when men came widely to believe that the
external world was subject to a few knowable laws, 
and was systematically capable of productive manipu­
lation.
An important feature of the traditional soci­
ety is that a ceiling exists on the attainable level
of output per head--this ceiling results from the 
fact that modern science and technology are either not 
available or not regularly and systematically applied. 
Thus, a traditional society is one which remains unmoved 
or untouched by man’s capability for manipulating his 
environment to his economic advantage. Generally, 
traditional societies, because of a low level of
Goran Ohlin, "Reflections on the Rostow Doc­
trine," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 
IX, No, 4 (July, 1961), p, 649•
17Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p, 4,
17
productivity, have to devote a high proportion of 
their resources to agriculture (usually 75 per cent 
or more of the -working force is engaged in agriculture). 
Also, arising from the agricultural system is a hier­
archical social structure with very little freedom for
18vertical mobility.
The traditional society is one within which 
change can take place, but the change is such that in 
one way or another it is assimilated "so that no
19cumulative irreversible renovation of society occurs."
In the traditional society, "the level of productivity
is limited by the absence of modern science ; men do
not think systematically about the natural world, or
20do not apply their discoveries." Thus, in the tradi­
tional society, "an almost unchanging technology places 
a ceiling on the level of attainable output per 
head.
1 ft°Ibid., pp. 4, 5 , & 18.
G, Checkland, "Theories of Economic and 
Social Evolution: The Rostow Challenge," Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. VII, No! 3 (Novem- 
ber, i960), p. 170.
2°Ibid.
21A. K. Cairncross , "The Stages of Economic 
Growth," Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 
XIII, No. 3 (April, 1961), p. 452.
18
The Preconditions for Take-Off
The "preconditions for take-off" is a tran­
sitional stage during which "a society prepares itself
--or is prepared by external forces--for sustained
22growth." This is a period during which a traditional 
society begins to become transformed in ways which 
enable it to "exploit the fruits of modern science, 
to fend off diminishing returns, and . . .  enjoy the 
blessings and choices opened up by the march of com­
pound interest [in this context "compound interest" 
is a shorthand way of suggesting that growth normally 
proceeds by geometric progression, much in the manner
of a savings account if the interest is left to
_ 2 3accumulate.J
During the preconditions period, the idea 
spreads that economic progress is not only possible, 
but also that economic progress is a necessary condi­
tion for some other purpose judged to be good--such 
as "national dignity," "private profit," "the general 
welfare," or "a better life for the children." New 
types of enterprising men become evident--men willing 
to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit of 
profit. These men come to be present in the private
22Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 17- 
^^Ibid., p. 6.
19
economy, in government, or in both. Banks and other
institutions for utilizing capital appear. Investment
increases, especially in the fields of transportation,
communications, and raw materials. Here and there,
modern manufacturing enterprises appear using new
methods, and the scope of commerce, both internal
24and external, widens.
In the period of transition between the tradi­
tional society and the take-off, often the political 
element is of decisive importance. Politically, the 
building of an effective centralized national state-- 
on the basis of coalitions touched with a new nation­
alism, in opposition to the colonial power--is a 
decisive aspect of the preconditions period; and it is
"almost universally, a necessary condition for take- 
2 Soff." A "reactive nationalism" crystallizing around 
an accumulating resentment of colonial rule is often 
a uniting force which transcends regional ties. In 
the end, local coalitions emerge which sometimes 
generate sufficient political and military pressures 
to force the withdrawal of the colonial power.




Professor Rostov’s "take-off" stage in a 
nation's growth has been compared to the "critical 
speed" which an airplane must reach before it can 
"get off the g r o u n d . " T h e  picture suggested is 
that of the sequence involved in putting an airplane 
(or a glider) into flight. First there are the check­
ing and fueling, which provide the pre-conditions 
[stage], then there is the relatively brief take-off, 
when the driving force is accelerated to produce the 
upward movement . . . [and] . . .  self-sustained 
flight."27
The take-off stage in a nation’s economic 
growth is a stage when the forces working for economic 
progress, that had previously yielded limited bursts 
of modern activity in certain sectors of the economy 
during the preconditions stage, expand and come to 
dominate the society; in effect, economic growth becomes
28the "normal condition" of the economy.
The take-off is interpreted by most development
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics; An Introductory 
Analysis (Seventh Edition; New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, I967), p. 74].
2 7Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure: 
Selected Essays (New York: W, ¥. Norton & Company,
1965), p. 227.
28Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 7»
21
economists as a relatively short period of time, 
"lasting not more than two or three decades, during 
which a series of events combine to ensure that per 
capita income will in the future rise rdgularly almost
,,29every year."
Quite often the beginning of a take-off can 
be traced to a particular sharp stimulus. It may 
come about through a technological innovation (includ­
ing a transport innovation) "which sets in motion a 
chain of secondary expansion in modern sectors and
has powerful potential external economy effects which
30the society exploits." Also, it may take the form 
of "a sharp relative rise in export prices and/or 
large new capital imports, as in the case of the United 
States from the late l840’s."^^
According to Professor Rostow's definition, 
all three of the following related conditions must be 
present in order for the take-off stage to occur :
(1 ) a rise in the rate of productive investment 
from, say, 5% or less to over 10% of national 
income (or net national product (NNP));
(2 ) the development of one or more substantial 
manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth;
^^Enke, p. 197»




(3) the existence or quick emergence of a poli­
tical, social and institutional framework which 
exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern 
sector and the potential external economy effects 
of the take-off and gives to growth an on-goingcharacter.32
The take-off stage is perhaps the most crucial
part of Professor Rostow's historical stages theory
and is a "great watershed, in which sustained growth
becomes a normal condition and is carried by a few
3 3rapidly expanding sectors," Perhaps one of the most
important changes required for the take-off stage to
occur is "a rise in the rate of investment to a level
which regularly, substantially and perceptibly out-
34strips population growth."
The Drive to Maturity
During Professor Rostow's "drive to maturity" 
stage the economy of a country "demonstrates the 
capacity to move beyond the original industries which 
powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply effi­
ciently over a very wide range of its resources--if not 
the whole range--the most advanced fruits of (then)
^^Ibid.. p. 39.
33ohlin, p. 649. 
34Cairncross, p 
Economic Growth, p. 21.
. 452; and Rostow, The Stages of
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3 5modem technology." When a nation is in this stage 
it finds a place in the international economy, and 
goods which were formerly imported are, or can be, 
produced at home. In other words, "this is the stage 
in which an economy demonstrates that it has the tech­
nological and entrepreneurial skills to produce not
g ̂
everything, but anything that it chooses to produce."
Usually about sixty years after the take-off
begins--say, perhaps forty years after the end of the
take-off--what might be termed "maturity" is attained.
The economy, which was focused during the take-off
around relatively few industries, extends its range
into "more refined and technologically often more
37complex processes." During the drive to maturity, 
then, "modern technology is extended to the whole
o Orange of economic activity."
"New methods and outlooks spread through the
whole economy [during the drive to maturity]. Incomes
for many people will increase, but the gains of most
citizens in consumable goods will not be great until
39maturity is well advanced."






In terms of sectoral development during the 
drive to maturity, the industrial process becomes more 
differentiated, with new leading sectors rising to 
supplant the older leading sectors of the take-off, 
and "deceleration” has increasingly slowed the pace 
of expansion of the older sectors.
The Age of High Mass-Consumption
The stage of "high mass-consumption" was reached 
by the United States in the 1920's. In Great Britain 
it began in the 1930's, and on the western European
4lcontinent it was a feature of the 1950's. As nations
have reached this stage, two things have happened;
real income per head has risen to a point where a
large number of persons have gained a command over a
level of consumption which transcends basic food,
shelter, and clothing needs; and the structure of
the working force has changed in ways which have
increased not only the proportion of urban to total
population, but also the proportion of the population
42working in offices or in skilled factory jobs.
The stage of high mass-consumption is characterized
40Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 59»
41Enke, p. 201.
42Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 10.
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by the automobile, a movement to suburbia, and an
43increased use of "durable" consumers’ goods. In 
this stage the leading sectors of the economy are ori­
ented more towards the production of durable consumers’ 
goods than previously; and, according to Professor 
Rostow, this is a phase from which the United States
44is just beginning to emerge.
In addition to these economic changes, a soci­
ety in the stage of high mass-consumption ceases "to
accept the further extension of modern technology as
4 5an overriding objective."
In the age of high mass-consumption, when a 
nation has a modernized and differentiated industrial 
machine, the nation’s leaders are confronted with the 
challenge of choosing among three great objectives;
They may seek to extend their external power and 
influence, using the new plenty as the basis of 
aggression, either regionally against their neigh­
bours or in a bid for hegemony.
Secondly, they may choose to promote social wel­
fare, making greater provision for social security, 
reducing the working day, promoting a more equal 
distribution of incomes and manipulating the economy 
to promote chosen social ends even where this might 
involve a decline in the total product or at least 
a lesser rate of growth.
43̂Enke, p. 201.
44Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 10. 
^^Ibid.. p. 11.
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Thirdly, the rulers concerned may prefer that 
society should enter upon the full enjoyment of 
high mass consumption with a minimum of inter­
vention from them. "
In actual practice, various societies choose different
4*7combinations of these three alternatives. '
Perhaps the key distinguishing characteristic 
of the age of high mass-consumption is that, "the 
leading sectors [of the economy} shift towards durable
48consumers' goods and services."
46Checkland, p. 171.
^^Ibid.
48Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 10; 
and Ohlin, p. 649.
CHAPTER III
NONEMPIRICAL APPRAISALS OF PROFESSOR 
ROSTOW'S THEORY
Introduction.
Professor ¥, W. Rostow's historical stages 
theory stimulated a great deal of controversy and 
discussion in the early 1960's after the publication 
of his book, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto.^ As a reflection of the wide­
spread interest at the time, his theory served as the 
central topic for several international conferences-- 
such as the International Economic Association's con­
ference held in Konstanz, Germany in I96O, and the 
First International Conference of Economic History 
held in Stockholm, Sweden in I96O.
Summarized here are a number of the comments 
and appraisals which have been made concerning Professor 
Rostow's theory. Where several different individuals
W, W, Rostow, The Sta.ges of Economic Growth: 




have made similar comments, these comments have been 
mentioned ohly once, unless they differ in some 
important respect. The journal articles and books 
dealt with here are by no means the only ones extant 
which pertain to Rostow's historical stages theory, 
but they are ones chosen because they are representa­
tive of the body of literature in this area. Contained 
in the present chapter are appraisals of Rostow's 
theory which are generally of a nonempirical nature, 
while in the next chapter the comments of Professor 
Simon Kuznets and several others are included along 
with summaries of the empirical studies they have con­
ducted relating to Rostow's theory.
Professor Rostow, like any other individual 
who has attempted to formulate a general theory, was 
faced with the problem of making his historical stages 
theory general enough to be relevant to a number of 
nations, yet specific enough to be of value when 
applied to a particular nation. Of necessity, any 
general theory such as this must be a compromise; 
and, as such, it becomes vulnerable to a wide range 
of criticism. Many criticisms of Rostow's theory 
center on comments that it is "over-simplified," 
that it lacks a sufficient body of supporting empiri­
cal evidence, that "distinct intervals" or breaks are 
absent between some of its "stages," and that it is
29
based in the main part on the experiences of only the 
modern developed Western nations and, as such, is 
not applicable to the problems facing the nations of 
the rest of the world. While some of the comments 
concerning Rostow's theory show insight and careful 
study, others indicate a lack of careful and complete 
reading of his theory and a misunderstanding of the 
concepts he attempted to set forth.
The nonempirical comments concerning Professor 
Rostow's theory are so diverse that grouping them 
according to topic heading would result in almost as 
many topic headings as comments. Thus, the approach 
used here is to group the comments under the individu­
als who have made them, ordering the individuals in 
such a way as to present as much unity as possible.
The views and appraisals concerning Professor Rostow's 
theory which follow are entirely those of the respective 
authorities cited; in these synopses the present author 
has made an earnest effort to exclude his own comments.
S. G. Checkland
According to Professor S. G. Checkland of the 
University of Glasgow, Professor Rostow's stages theory 
of economic development contains much historical truth 
when taken at the appropriate level of generality.
Since the late eighteenth century the experiences of
30
the most advanced industrial, nations of the time--Great 
Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Sweden, 
Japan, and Russia--have conformed to approximately 
the pattern that Professor Rostow describes. Rostow 
has provided us with a kind of mnemonic scale with 
which we can arrange our thoughts. Also, Rostow's 
theory provides many illuminating insights into the 
historical operation of phases which societies go 
through. These seem particularly well brought out 
as Rostow traces the movement of initiative from one 
sector of a nation's economy to another.
As we move, though, from historical descrip­
tion on to theory, certain difficulties arise. To 
what extent are we being told that societies, once 
they have "taken-off," are embarked upon a cumulative, 
automatic course? Is Professor Rostow setting forth 
a fairly narrow set of conditions which, if they are 
present, will drive forward the growth process; or 
is he, to a certain extent, stating or implying the 
need for a certain number of further conditions reach­
ing far back into the nature of society, and themselves 
not assimilated into his theory? In the extent to 
which the latter is true, Rostow's theory seems to 
lose a great deal of comprehensiveness.
Another difficulty lies in determining where 
each economy falls within Professor Rostow's system.
31
This presumably can be determined by the inspection 
of particular economies, and then by noting how they 
are getting along in the increase and diversification 
of their output. Even so, the timing of this process 
is difficult to ascertain, and there is no built-in 
clue as to the speed of this self-contained process. 
Although Rostow provides us with very little systematic 
help in the matter of timing, he does give us much
2particular historical demonstration and reasoning.
Albert Fishlow
Professor Albert Fishlow of the University of 
California at Berkeley makes a number of perceptive 
comments and shows a great amount of insight into 
Professor Rostow's theory in his review of The Eco­
nomics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth (W. ¥. Rostow,
Oeditor), which is a report of the proceedings of the 
i960 International Economic Association Conference at 
Konstanz, Germany, which dealt with Rostow's historical 
stages theory.
Professor Fishlow states that despite frequent
2S. G. Checkland, "Theories of Economic and 
Social Evolution; The Rostow Challenge," Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. VII, N0I 3 (Novem­
ber, i960), p. 183.
OW. W. Rostow (ed.). The Economics of Take- 
Off into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1968).
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clarifications and restatements of the take-off con­
cept at the conference by Rostow, the underlying 
duality of the take-off concept was not resolved.
At the first level, "the take-off is a sec­
toral, non-linear, threshold notion . . . [in] . . .  
the realm of the leading sector, with its forward, 
backward and spreading effects breathing regular 
innovation into the heretofore slumbering corpus 
economicum. It is the domain of certain crucial
industries, such as those of coal, iron and engineer- 
4ing." At this level, economic growth can be viewed 
as a constant struggle among a succession of activi­
ties, or sectors, first accelerating and then decel­
erating.
At the second level, the take-off concept is 
highly aggregative. It is in "the setting . . .  of 
the familiar Harrod-Domar model in which the rate of 
growth of income is the product of an average propen­
sity to save and the inverse of a reasonably stable 
capital-output r a t i o . A t  this level, then, the 
take-off consists of a recognizable discontinuity 
in the observed growth of per capita income--which 
under these conditions means a sharp increase in the
4Albert Fishlow, "Empty Economic Stages?," 
Economic Journal, Vol. LXXV (March, I965), p. 113.
^Ibid.
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rate of savings. These two theories are not, of course, 
mutually exclusive; but neither are they ever inte­
grated by Rostow into a single framework.
At the first level, the discussion of inter­
industrial relationships takes for granted thé avail­
ability of resources and emphasizes instead the power 
of demand as a connecting link in stimulating growth 
among complementary activities. In effect, then, a 
mechanism exists for transmitting autonomous impulses 
affecting one sector to the economy as a whole--not 
only by means of output, but also by means of tech­
nology. On the other hand, at the second level, the 
aggregative model takes as its starting point the con­
straint of savings, and hence of investment, without 
which growth cannot attain regularity at high rates.
It seems that, within an environment where 
the inducement to invest is the limiting factor rather 
than savings, the sectoral, or first, approach would 
be the more fruitful one.^ However, Professor Rostow 
fails to state the conditions under which one approach 
rather than the other yields a better explanation of 
how growth takes root, or of how the two approaches 
are related. By shifting between these two approaches 
in an almost random fashion, Rostow seems to do the
^Ibid.
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concept of the take-off very little service; and by 
not introducing resource constraints and a more com­
plete discussion of technological diffusion into his 
firstj or sectoral, theory he deprives it of a clarity 
and consistency that the second, or aggregative, theory 
enjoys.
Overall, the second, or aggregative, approach 
to the take-off has not fared well. While it is unable 
to deliver the universal, endogenous theory of develop­
ment it promises, such criticism should not obscure 
the numerous insights the take-off has to offer at
gthe first, or sectoral, level.
One can, according to Professor Fishlow, find 
several concrete instances in which Professor Rostow 
was in error. One of these is the supposed importance 
of the railroad in triggering the take-off. In the 
United States, for example, Rostow misstated the role 
played by the railroad before i860 in assisting the 
development of a machinery industry. Fishlow states : 
"The reason locomotives and other equipment were pro­
duced domestically so soon after the introduction of 
the railway was that machinery firms were already in 





Virtually all the locomotive firms grew out of such
Qorigins." The unique significance of the railroad 
resides in the engineering inputs required in its 
substantial maintenance requirements. "Widely dis­
persed repair shops training pools of local talent 
undoubtedly were a significant factor in technologi­
cal diffusion.
Professor Rostow's emphasis on the indus­
trial consequences resulting from the backward link­
age of railroadisation as being crucial in the United 
States seems to miss the point. At the time when pig 
iron output first underwent an apparent rapid expansion 
in the l840's, iron rail demand was an insignificant 
proportion of the whole. Coal, also, was only a 
minor need for railroad operations in this era of 
wood-burning engines. What really made the rapid 
projection of the railroad in the l850's so important 
was the impetus it gave to agricultural expansion.
"In this and other instances Rostow tends to under­
state the role of the market, actual and anticipated, 
in favor of derived demand nexuses. While the latter 
may to-day be more potent, we should not re-write 




impelled by relative prices as well as by government, 
and by way of forward linkages as well as backward.
The important thing to note, though, is that 
Professor Rostow gives productivity increase an explicit 
and central position in his theory. "This is a great 
advance beyond the simple capital-accumulation models
*1 pstill current."
According to Professor Fishlow, the claim and 
emphasis of universality for Professor Rostow's take­
off is a serious mistake; the take-off concept provides 
no opportunity to array national experiences--no chance 
to contrast and compare, and thus to fashion a hypothe­
sis relevant to all countries. Nineteenth and twenti­
eth-century take-offs are not differentiated by Rostow;
he uses his simple aggregative model to serve for all
13times and places.
Professor Fishlow feels that an unfortunate 
rigidity is imposed by enmeshing the take-off concept 
within a "full-blown" stage theory of economic evolu­
tion. As in most nineteenth-century conceptions of 
progress, the path suggested by Professor Rostow is 
orderly and monotonie: societies move through each
l^Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
^^Ibid.. p. 124, 
l^ibid.. p. 119.
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of the stages in succession. Unfortunately, though, 
excluded by such a hierarchy are many of the most 
interesting cases--econoraies that entered well into 
.the transition phase but did not succeed. In particu­
lar, a number of the nations in Latin America seem to 
have been so beset.
Barry E. Supple
Professor Barry E. Supple of the University 
of Sussex has made some general comments concerning 
the potential contributions of the Economic History 
approach which relate to Professor Rostow's work. 
According to Professor Supple, ". . . it seems . . . 
that We know too little about economic processes 
(whether in a backward or a developing context) to 
ignore any possible source of enlightenment or tech­
nique of s t u d y . S u p p l e  fëels that economists tend 
to expect too much from history, and that they tend 
to extend their own emphasis of "simplicity and gen­
erality" into an area which cannot sustain it in 
precisely the same form. As a result of this, econo­
mists tend to be disappointed when, looking for
^^Ibid. . p. 115.
^^Barry E. Supple, "Has the Early History of 
Developed Countries any Current Relevance?," American 
Economic Review. Vol. LV (May, I965), p. 103.
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universal hypotheses, they come tb discover, "that 
economic history does not yield what it cannot pro­
duce.
Andre Gunder Frank
Professor Andre Gunder Frank of Sir George 
Williams University in Montreal provides some severe 
criticisms of Professor Rostov's theory. According 
to Professor Frank, it is impossible, without closing 
one's eyes, to find in today's world any country or 
society which has the characteristics of Professor 
Rostow's first, traditional, stage. This is not sur­
prising, though, "since the construction of Rostow's 
stages takes account neither of the history of the 
now underdeveloped countries, nor of their crucial
relations with the now developed ones over several
17centuries past." Not only is Rostow's first, 
traditional, stage not to be found in any underde­
veloped country today; but also his second stage, 
the preconditions for take-off into economic devel-
T Oopment, is even more conspicuous by its absence.
l^Ibid.. pp. 100-101.
17Andre Gunder Frank, Rostow's Stages of Eco­
nomic Growth through Escalation to Nuclear Destruction 
(Ann Arhor, Michigan: The Radical Education Project),p . 2 .
l^Ibid., p. 3.
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"Abundant historical evidénce from the Under­
developed countries shows that Rostow's first two
stages are fictional. Contemporary evidence from them
19shows that his last two stages are utopian." This
"misrepresentation of reality" by Rostow follows from
a theoretical error of the first magnitude and of
vital importance for development theory and policy.
The error is that of "examining only parts of the
20domestic structure of the country concerned."
The fundamental reason why the whole of Pro­
fessor Rostow's approach must be rejected by those 
who would meaningfully understand and deal with the 
problems of economic development and cultural change 
is that his approach, in all its variations "ignores
the historical and structural reality of the underde-
21veloped countries."
A. K. Cairncross
Professor A. K. Cairncross of the University 
of Glasgow doubts that Professor Rostow's historical 
stages theory of economic development helps us to 
understand "the sweep of modern history." In addition,
^^Ibid. , p. 4.
^^Ibid. , p. 7. 
^^Ibid.
4o
he cites a number of difficulties inherent in Pro­
fessor Rostow's historical stages approach. First, 
do the available data provide an adequate basis for 
generalization? The relevant data mainly relate to 
a dozen or so countries over the past century or two. 
"Even for this dozen countries, the key statistics, 
until comparatively recently, are highly imperfect: 
for example, the course of real wages and the move­
ment of savings-ratios are open to serious dispute 
for all countries before 1913 and so far as I know 
there is no reliable cost of living index number for 
any country covering the whole of the nineteenth
ii22century,"
Also, it might be asked, "Can a country fall 
back into the stage of preconditions after an abortive 
take-off, or take-off more than once, or keep flutter­
ing as if it were about to take-off without ever 
2 3doing so?" Is Professor Rostow's sequence of stages 
invariable, so that one is able to tell in advance 
what lies ahead? Also, how can one tell whether the 
transition from one stage to another is complete?
"When Rostow gives dates for the beginning and end
22A, K, Cairncross, "The Stages of Economic
Growth," Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 
XIII, No,"3 (April, 1961), pT 5^3.
^^Ibid.
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of take-bff, by what criteria, open to corroboration
24by other historians, does he select these dates?"
Perhaps the most doubtful of Professor Rostow's 
stages is his last one; If Rostow had named his final 
stage "the age of the automobile" how much of his 
meaning would have been lost? Rostow himself had 
in mind other consumers' durables in addition to 
automobiles, and he referred several times to hous­
ing. It is difficult for one to see any special sig­
nificance in the fact that at higher levels of income 
people show an elastic demand for durable goods. "A 
much more significant fact is the tendency in modern 
times for rising incomes to go with greater equality-- 
a fact that Rostow does not analyse and that in itself 
helps to account for the mass consumption of durable 
goods,
Professor Cairncross asks, "What is the sig­
nificance of the threefold choice between national 
power, social welfare, and high mass consumption in 
the final stage, when the same choice has had to be 
made all along the path of growth? If the choice is 
a free one it need not fall on high mass consumption."^^
2^ibid.
^^Ibid. , p. 454. 
^^Ibid.
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According to Professor Cairncross, the stage 
of Professor Rostow’s theory that has struck the pub­
lic mind most forcibly is the take-off. Is there a 
genuine discontinuity rather than a simple accelera­
tion of growth; and, if so, in what form does this 
discontinuity show itself? In what sense does this 
discontinuity herald a decisive break with the past, 
and is it conceivable that this discontinuity is of 
such a nature that it can be identified with a pre-
27cise span of time, say twenty years?
Professor Rostow cites a rise in the rate
of productive investment during the take-off, "from,
28say, 5% or less to over 10% of national income."
This is a view that has been expressed by some other
economists, notably Arthur Lewis, although no one 
other than Rostow has associated it with the take­
off period. Presently available historical evidence, 
though, does not justify Rostow's "quite exceptional
emphasis laid on a sharp increase in this ratio how-
29ever measured, at the outset of rapid growth."
In the light of these things, does Professor
Rostow's approach help us to understand what went on
'̂̂ Ibid. 
28Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 39<
oq Cairncross, p. 4$6.
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in any individual case of industrialization or make 
it easier to see what a particular country seeking 
to industrialize itself ought to do? "It would be 
absurd to answer these questions with a blank nega­
tive; a great deal of what Rostow says is undoubtedly
helpful. But it is so . . . in spite of, father than
30because of, the stage approach which he adopts."
P. T. Bauer and Charles Wilson
According to Professors Bauer and Wilson of 
the London School of Economics and Jesus College, Cam­
bridge, Professor Rostow's stages of growth theory 
provides not only an analytical framework for the 
study of economic development everywhere and at all 
times, but it also lays bare the essentials of past 
and present world conflicts, and of the dangers that 
beset us. In addition, it points the way to action 
designed to remove both the threats of mass destruc­
tion and of spiritual stagnation in the west and also 
to promote the development of the under-developed 
world.
Professor Rostow's book. The Stages of
30Ibid., pp. 457-458.
T. Bauer and Charles Wilson, "The Stages 
of Growth," Economica. New Series, Vol. XXIX (May,
1962), p. 193.
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Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto, has been
widely praised. Part of this book's attraction seems
to be derived I'rom factors external to its central
theme and approach. The appeal owes much to Rostow's
forecasts and proposals for policy, since in many
ways they tell people what they want to hear as, for
example, his proposals for massive foreign aid, or,
even more important perhaps, his suggestion that there
are readily discernible and not too complex methods
for resolving some of the world's most intractable
problems. Rostow's frequent references to "history"
32also enhance his book's appeal.
I
la Professor Rostow's explanation of the 
progress from one of his stages to the next satis­
factory? Rostow claims to offer a general theory of 
economic development by laying bare the specific fac­
tors behind the advance of societies from one stage 
to the next, but the claim does not seem to be sub­
stantiated. At times he suggests that progress 
depends on a few specific variables, while at others 
this is significantly modified by the introduction 
of additional variables and qualifications often 
so general as to cover almost all situations. His 
exposition thus vacillates between the suggestion.
3^Ibid.. pp. 193-194.
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on one hand, that the configuration of societies in 
particular stages of development and their progress 
from one stage to the next are shaped by certain 
key variables, and the suggestion, on the other 
hand, that they depçnd essentially on a large number 
of interrelated variables and influences, which are 
often unspecified and the operation of which depends 
mainly on local circumstances. These additional 
variables and qualifications are sufficiently numer­
ous and stated in sufficiently general terms so as 
to reduce much of the argument to unhelpful state­
ments such as that economies will advance if there 
are enough progressive sectors, or that in economic 
life all factors are interrelated and that everything 
depends on everything else. A theory such as this 
which depends oh such escape clauses cannot be
effectively refuted; but, equally, it cannot explain 
3 3anything.
Nowhere does Professor Rostow offer clearly 
defined specific criteria for.the definition and dating 
of his historical stages of growth. These stages are 
not defined in terms of clear-cut or specific cultural, 
scientific, material or technical attainment; and the 
absence of such criteria enables Rostow to classify
^^Ibid. , pp. 194-195.
46
historical periods practically at will. Thus, he 
is able to regard eighteenth or even nineteenth- 
century Britain, North America and Western Europe 
as falling in his traditional stage, while regard­
ing large parts of the underdeveloped world in the 
twentieth century, including India, as being two 
stages further forward.
At crucial stages in his discussion where 
the argument requires a measure of precision, the 
terms employed by Professor Rostow are imprecise and 
hazy. For example, the stage he terms "maturity" 
is said to be attained when new, modern techniques 
spread throughout the economy; but if "modern" 
refers to what is most advanced at any given time, 
then neolithic Europe was a mature economy with tech­
niques that were in advance of those of the old stone 
age. As for his "age of high mass-consumption," it 
is arbitrary to designate, as Rostow does, the wide­
spread use of consumer durables as its criterion.
"High" is of necessity a comparative concept, usually 
relative to what has gone before. Thus, the nineteenth- 
century can at least as justifiably be termed the age 
of high mass-consumption; because its articles were 
cheap clothing, soap, sugar, tea, and many other com­
modities which caused a radical transformation in the
47
34social life of the people.
Professor Rostow’s choice of a 10 percent 
rate of net investment as being required for a con­
tinued rise in real income per hedd, if that is what 
he means by self-sustained growth, is arbitrary.
Even if the rate of growth of income per head depended 
mainly on the growth of capital and on technical 
advance, a continuous rise in income per head could 
be attained with a much lower rate of net capital 
formation where technical progress is sufficiently 
rapid, or where the population is stationary or 
increases slowly.
Three points might be noted about Professor 
Rostow’s theory. First, Rostow's account of the 
path of development after the take-off deals entirely 
with success stories, in as much as it is confined 
to countries which are now a part of the developed 
world. Second, his policy proposals reflect a belief 
that the differences between different levels and 
rates of economic development are largely temporary 
and abnormal and can be bridged or eliminated as a 
result of comparatively simple policy proposals in a 
relatively brief period of time. This view appears to
^^Ibid, , p, 196, 
35lbid,, p. 197.
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be unsubstantiated, and seems contrary to both his­
torical and contemporary evidence. Third, and perhaps 
most important, Rostov's policy proposals totally 
ignore the relevance of the factors just enumerated, 
especially habits, attitudes, qualities, customs, and 
institutions; and although his theory appears to 
embrace economic, political, and cultural influences, 
the proposals he makes, based on his key variables, 
seem to reflect a belief in economic development with- 
out cultural change.
Goran Ohlin
According to Professor Goran Ohlin of Columbia 
University, the mysteries of economic growth and devel­
opment have not been couched in such a beguiling termi­
nology and such a simple but powerful analysis until 
Professor Rostow presented what he terms "an economic 
historian's way of envisaging the sweep of modern 
history." What is important, in evaluating Professor 
Rostow's historical stages theory, is how useful and 
rewarding it is to view historical growth through his 
particular prism. It should be noted that his treatment
^^ibid.. p. 199.
Goran Ohlin, "Reflections on the Rostow 
Doctrine," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
Vol. IX, NoT 4 (July, 1961), p. 648, '
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of the traditional and transitional societies is
o oremarkably successful in spite of its brevity. His 
smart and snappy take-off, though, seems only to be 
the old Industrial Revolution in a streamlined ver­
sion.
Professor Rostow's "age of high mass-consump­
tion" stage is not a statistical concept at all. He 
defines it as the consumption of durables: automobiles,
refrigerators, washing machines, television sets, and 
all the gadgetry of modern life. ¥e might ask why the 
countries of Western Europe did not in the 1920's pro­
ceed directly into the age of durable consumers' goods, 
as did the United States. Rostow's answer ambiguously 
refers to "governments" and "people" in explaining the 
stagnation of the European economies in the 1920's.
"Can this by anything but nonsense? There is no men­
tion of relative incomes in Rostow's pages, but when 
West European per capita incomes in the 1920's were 
about half (or less) of the American, this would . . . 
seem to go far in explaining why Europeans might have 
found difficulty in following the . . . lead set by
4oAmerican consumers." After World War II when
^^Ibid. , p. 649. 
39lbid. , p. 650. 
^^Ibid. , p. 651.
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European incomes reached the level the United States
had attained in the 1920's, the age of gadgetry
finally dawned on Western Europe. One can only worider
why Rostow must make such simple things so complicated,
4lwhen he can make such complicated things so simple.
The question is not only how one should choose 
his stages, but also how deep a significance he should 
attribute to their definition. "The Rostovian sequence 
pretends to a theoretical backbone of sorts, but when 
it makes one squirm with unease at many points, it is 
above all because it brings into the open the tension 
between continuity and periodization in historical 
analysis.
J. H. Habakkuk
Professor J. H. Habakkuk of the London School 
of Economics has some rather severe criticisms of 
Professor Rostow's historical stages theory. He 
feels that Rostow's book. The Stages of Economic 
Growth! A Non-Communist Manifesto, belongs in that 
category of literature, of which in economics Malthus's, 
Essay on Population, is the most notable example, which 




into a few central categories. This book contains 
some ideas on how one stage proceeds toward the next, 
but these stages do not cohere into anything which 
could be reasonably dignified as a theory of produc­
tion— the book is essentially an essay in classifica­
tion.
At the center of Professor Rostow's argument 
is the assertion that during the take-off stage there
is one brief interval in the history of a society in
which changes take place which insure that growth 
becomes the normal condition of that society. As to 
whether periods so critical and so precisely compressed 
in time exist, Professor Habakkuk feels that the Euro­
pean experience did not conform to this pattern. In 
the European nations, growth has been more rapid in
some periods than in others, and some innovations, such
as the railways, have had much more profound effects 
than others; but he sees no evidence that there has 
been solely one decisive phase in the history of each
43growing economy.
In addition, Professor Rostow's preconditions 
stage presents certain difficulties. Certainly one of 
the most important requirements of a precondition must
40 'J. H. Habakkuk, "A Review of. The Stages of 
Economic (àrowth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, by W. W.
Rostow." Economic Journal^ Vol. LXXI, No. 2o3 (Septem­
ber, 1961), p. 601.
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be that it occur first in time. In England, though, 
the principal changes in transportation and agriculture 
took place during rather than before the period of 
accelerated growth; in Russia the pertinent agricul­
tural developments occurred late in the decade after 
the take-off had gotten under way, and in China they 
are occurring in the middle of the period to which 
Rostow assigns her take-off. Thus, in many cases the 
increase of agricultural output and the creation of 
social overhead capital are not conditions whose pre­
existence explains the acceleration of growth; instead, 
they are a part of the acceleration which needs to be 
explained.
Another criticism by Professor Habakkuk con­
cerns Professor Rostow's references, in his book, to 
"self-sustaining," "self-reinforcing," and "on-going" 
growth. This, according to Habakkuk, does not seem to 
be anything more than growth of the usual straight­
forward variety; but the adjectives used by Rostow 
seem to offer an assurance that once one or two criti­
cal decades are over, a society can rely on automatic 
growth to carry it forward into the following stages. 
Although in Rostow's book the approximate date of the 
Turkish take-off is given as 1937» a footnote states
IlIlIbid., pp. 6OI-602.
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that--almost a quarter of a century later--it still 
remains to be seen whether Turkey has successfully 
made the transition into self-sustaining growth.
Thus, it appears that Rostov's take-offs can only be 
confidently identified retrospectively--and that we 
can only tell if growth is going to be self-sustain­
ing* if in fact, it has been sustained for a long 
period of time.
On the positive side, there are in Professor 
Rostow's book some penetrating pages on colonialism, 
and a highly original analysis of why post-19^5 has 
been so different from post-1918. Few of Rostow's 
insights seem to depend on his stages of growth, "but 
it may fairly be retorted that it was in the course 
of elaborating these stages that Professor Rostow had 
these insights.
The Rostovian stages are very much less mis­
leading than the Marxian stages of feudalism, capital­
ism, imperialism, and socialism; but the virtue of a 
given system is not to be judged by its power to 
establish itself as a mnemonic--nor by its random 
shafts of light. Any system will yield fresh view­
points because it compels a person to group facts in 
unaccustomed ways, and often a quite arbitrary system
Ibid., p. 603.
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yields many new viewpoints because of the great gap 
between expectations and facts. The important test, 
then, is whether the system makes the past more intel­
ligible and the future more predictable. Professor 
Rostow's theory does not seem to succeed in doing 
either.
Everett E. Hagen
According to Professor Everett E. Hagen of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Inter­
national Studies, one of the primary causes of the 
wide popularity of Professor Rostow's book is the idea 
conveyed by it that there is order in this uncertain 
world. Professor Rostow's book implies that the seri­
ous efforts of men to bring about economic growth will 
be rewarded, and that once the chain of events has been 
started, a self-sustaining economic growth will follow. 
Many of the readers of Rostow's book have gained a 
feeling of comfort and relief, "from the brilliantly 
portrayed doctrine of neat and rather rapid stages of
4?progress to economic success."
Professor Rostow's division into stages and
■ ̂^Ibid. , pp. 603-6o4.
Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social 
Change; How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illihois 
Dorsey Press, I967), p. 515.
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assignment of some events to one stage and others to 
another seems somewhat removed from reality to be use­
ful for explanation or prediction. Among Rostow's 
preconditions is the establishment of an effective 
national government, and among the events of his take­
off is the quick emergence of a favorable political, 
social, and economic framework. The terms Rostow 
uses in describing institutional changes are quali­
tative and ambiguous ones, and, thus, it is nearly 
impossible to determine when they have been satisfied. 
In addition, a survey of the historical evidence indi­
cates that rather than certain institutional condi­
tions being absolute requisites whose attainment can 
be assigned to one stage or another, institutions and 
governments gradually became more favorable to growth 
as the groups which were interested in new economic 
activities gradually gained more success, influence,
48and power.
Case studies of specific countries have shown 
this sort of an emergence of more favorable political, 
social, and economic institutions by degree, while 
economic growth, similarly, proceeded by degree and 
without waiting for any given sort of institutional 
structure. The gradual appearance of favorable
48 Ibid., p. 517.
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institutions from the late Middle Ages through the 
nineteenth century is widespread knowledge and may be 
referred to without being cited. "Even effective 
national government in the minimum sense of that terra 
seems not to have been a necessary condition for 
growth.
The reason the trend in capital formation is 
thought by Professor Rostow and almost all other econo­
mists to be so important is that, since technological 
advances are embodied in capital formation, an adequate 
rate of capital formation is necessary for a rapid 
improvement in techniques and for a rise in per capita 
incomes; direct evidence concerning trends in tech­
nological progress and per capita incomes is therefore 
relevant to the point at issue. Presently available 
evidence, though, indicates a gradual change from an 
early period onward, rather than a movement in stages.
Although Professor Rostow is in error in array­
ing the évents of the transition from traditionalism 
to economic modernism into a sequence of stages, such 
that one stage is completed before another begins, 
this fact should not obscure the perceptiveness of 
his analysis in other areas. Rostow's historical
^^Ibid., p. 518. 
50lbid., p. 520.
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stages theory is an insightful summary of the complex
changes which occur, from which any student of the
process of economic development may obtain provocative
suggestions and an awareness of aspects he had not
51fully appreciated before.
Gerald M. Meier
According to Professor Gerald M, Meier of 
Stanford University, the poor countries of today not 
only confront Professor Rostow's take-off stage from 
an absolutely lower level of per capita income than 
did the presently developed countries, but also their 
relative positions are inferior as compared to those 
of other countries. This is quite unlike the position 
of the early comers to economic development which 
entered the industrialization process from a position 
of superior per capita income relative to that of 
other countries. Thus, the implications of attempt­
ing to develop rapidly from a lower level of per capita 
income, and from a relative position which entails
more pressures of backwardness, deserves a fuller
52treatment than Rostow's analysis provides.
51lbid. , p. 522. 
52Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues. in. Develop­
ment Economics: Selected Materials and Commentarv
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964 ), pi 43,
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Another fundamental difference is that many 
of today's poor nations have not, as of yet, experi­
enced a significant degree of agricultural improve­
ments as a basis for industrialization. The failure 
to have yet gone through such an agricultural revolu­
tion makes the present problem of the take-off much 
more difficult than it was for the now developed
nations when they were first entering into their
53industrial revolutions.
In short, the cultural contexts in many of
today's poor nations may not yet be as favorable to
economic development as they were in the now developed
nations before their take-offs. Also, whereas the
currently developed nations had already enjoyed a
long period of political independence and a stable
political framework before their take-offs, most of
the currently poor nations have only recently acquired
5 Aa real measure of political independence.
M. Kant
According to Professor M, Kant of Manchester 
University, Professor Rostow has ignored, or assumed 
to be trivial, the inhibition that capital formation
53lbid., p. 44. 
^^Ibid.. p. 45.
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in underdeveloped nations may suffer due to the demon­
stration effect on consumption patterns, especially 
during periods of rapid income redistribution and 
growth. The demonstration effect , by increasing the 
demand for luxury goods and thereby causing a shift 
in factor allocation, may bring about a deviation of 
capital formation away from its optimum path. Rostow 
inaccurately assumes that, once an economy has received 
its initial momentum, the necessary supply of savings 
will flow into the channels of capital formation.
Also, Professor Rostow's projection of capital 
growth seems to have another defect in it. Rostow 
gives very little consideration to the problem of 
employment during the take-off. As the growth of 
capital gradually goes on becoming a built-in feature 
of the take-off economy, the productive process tends 
to become more and more capital-intensive. This pro­
duces two contrary effects in the economy: first, a
rise in the marginal productivity of labor, and, second, 
an increase in the amount of unemployment. The second 
effect is likely to reduce the rate of capital formation 
to a level below that consistent with the social opti­
mal rate of growth. This possibility has not been 
properly attended to by Rostow in his capital scheme
60
55relating to the take-off.
It is extremely doubtful that Professor Ros­
tow's suppositions relating to the self-sustaining 
growth of the take-off can be substantiated. Rostow 
seems to assume the existence of entrepreneurs who 
are imbued with a pioneering zeal to embark on new 
enterprises at a time when depression is gradually 
overtaking the leading sectors. In such a circumstance, 
it would seem probable, instead, that the resistance 
to new investments would increase. Since Rostow's 
concept does not encompass the Keynesian prescription 
of balancing investment by the state on such occasions, 
it is not apparent how the economy can regather its 
momentum under such a situation. Consequently, Ros­
tow's self-sustained growth model does not work unless 
we assume that the state artificially creates, through 
investment and other devices, new leading sectors-- 
thus giving the economy continued momentum in its growth. 
This device, though, falls outside the range of assump­
tions discussed by Rostow.
The dynamic method is more appropriate in 
explaining the nature of a growing economy, of which
Kant, "Rostow's Take-Off: An Appraisal,"
Indian Journal of Economics. Vol. XLIII (July, 1962), 
p. 29.
S ^ I b i d . .  p. 31.
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the take-off is one brief span; and it is to be 
regretted that Professor Rostov's analysis of the 
take-off period is essentially static. The equili­
brium of Rostov's take-off economy is based on the 
concept of once-over changes rather than on steadily 
continuing change. Thus, ve find that the equilibria 
vhich he visualizes for successive leading sectors 
are similar in nature. Furthermore, he is more con­
cerned vith absolute rates of investment, or produc­
tion, than vith the relative changes in those rates. 
Thus, the dynamic approach vhich consists, in essence, 
of examining ever changing variables, finds practically 
no place in Rostov's scheme.
In the end, it must be acknovledged that Pro­
fessor Rostov has reoriented the study of economic 
grovth by linking it up vith a convergence of social, 
political, and economic values. Even Rostov's economic 
concept of the take-off, vhich has been so videly
criticized, expresses in a general sense an impres­
s'?sive phenomenon of transformation.
William N. Parker
Professor William N. Parker of the University 
of North Carolina in his American Economic Reviev
57lbid.. p. 32.
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article states that there is a peculiar, baffling 
charm to the set of lectures contained in Professor 
Rostow's book, The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non- 
Communist Manifesto; in these lectures history is made 
simple. Simplicity, relevance, and a high degree of 
sincerity are some of the important sources of the 
widespread appeal of these lectures, but there are 
other sources as well. There appear on every page 
bold assertions, immense claims, and sweeping insights 
which are unsubstantiated by analysis or documenta- 
tion.58
It is regrettable that, for all his boldness
and bravado. Professor Rostow has remained tied to an
extremely conventional historical framework. We see,
gleaming up through the water, a broken image of the
59school of Schmoller.
J. H. van Stuijvenberg
Professor J. H. van Stuijvenberg, a historian, 
makes several criticisms of Professor Rostow's 
preconditions stage. According to Professor van 
Stuijvenberg, given Professor Rostow's criteria, the
William N. Parker, "A Review of. The Stages 
of Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto, by 
W. W. Rostow," American Economic Review, Vol. L, No. 5 
(December, I96O), p. IO5Ô.
59lbid., p. 1059.
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available historical evidence indicates that the 
initial date of the preconditions stage for Western 
Europe could be placed around the time of the cru­
sades, about 1600, or in the middle of the 1700's—  
rather than in the early 1700's where Rostow places 
it. Thus, it is not surprising that Rostow is so 
vague in indicating the commencement of the precondi­
tions stage. In fact, in Western Europe the transi­
tion from the traditional society to the take-off took 
place so gradually that it is fully justified to ask 
whether a definite transition, indeed, ever took
, 60place.
Professor Rostow's definition of his fourth 
stage of growth, the drive to maturity, also seems to 
have given him a great deal of difficulty. "If we 
are not mistaken . ... there is, in the last analysis, 
no essential difference between the take-off [the 
third stage] and the drive to maturity [the fourth 
stagej." It is difficult to draw a hard line of 
distinction between these two stages, because there 
exists no definite interruption in the growth. The 
take-off transforms so very gradually, and without any
^^Henri Baudet and J. H. van Stuijvenberg, 
"Rostow's Theory on Growth," Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv. Vol. XC, Hft. 1(1963), pp. 67-68.
G^Ibid.. p. 72.
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essential change, into the drive to maturity thàt 
the wholh distinction between these two stages seems 
artificial and superfluous,^^
The conclusion to be drawn is that the concep­
tion of the stages of growth as presented by Professor 
Rostow is not acceptable. The distinction between 
Rostow*s stages is rather arbitrary and subjective, 
and the boundaries between them are somewhat unclear. 
Thus, we are forced to conclude that historical events
refuse to be forced into Rostow's scheme, and perhaps
63into any scheme whatsoever,
Henri Baudet
Professor Henri Baudet, a historian, feels 
that Professor Rostow's historical ideas are similar 
to those of Spengler and especially those of Toynbee 
in many respects. All three of these historians 
appear to have a common pretension of empiricism and 
a common method of extrapolation. They all met the 
psychological needs, and expressed the general feelings 
of their times, Spengler, in 1917» expressed feelings 
of despair and inexorable disaster; Toynbee and Rostow, 
at a later time, gave expression to the hope of new
G^Ibid,. p. 73. 
G^lbid,. pp. 74-75,
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64chances for a struggling and persevering world.
Professor Baudet suggests that, even though 
Professor Rostow frequently mentions the importance 
of human response, he nevertheless fails to include 
genuine human factors in his theory. Rostow presents 
culture as the result of human attitudes and value 
systems in which neither myth nor religion plays an 
important part. In short, Rostow does not seem to 
bother with the psychological and irrational sources 
of culture.
As an example of Professor Rostow's neglect, 
or oversimplification, of cultural factors. Professor 
Baudet suggests that, "Rostow's easy conviction of a 
general human equality seems . . .  typically Amei:ican, 
i.e., typically representative of the modern American 
approach to the problem of under-developed countries 
and of the American creed about future world-democracy.
Professor Baudet does not take issue with 
Professor Rostow's careful analysis of British economic 
growth over the last two centuries; but he does dis­
pute, on cultural-historical, on anthropological, and 
on psychological grounds, what he terms Rostow's
^^Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
^^Ibid., p. 6l. 
^^Ibid., p. 62.
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6 7"generalization" of the British sequence of stages.
In summary, Professor Rostov's analysis of 
economic growth and its stages in nineteenth century 
England, carried out along the lines of the historical 
school, gives a convincing sequence of stages of 
development--and although each equivalent case of 
another Western nation has had its particular charac­
teristics and qualities. Professor Baudet believes in 
a general validity of Rostow's main theses, to the 
extent that nations of our own culture are concerned.
On the other hand, he believes that Rostow's ideas 
of the non-Western world and of the depths of its 
real problems are fundamentally short-sighted and 
erroneous. The extrapolation of the British experi­
ence to a world scale is, in his opinion, unacceptable, 
both on methodological and on factual grounds,
Summary
Whether or not Professor Rostow is correct 
in all of the specific aspects of his theory, the 
amount of comment and discussion it has stimulated 




much to reorient the study of economic growth by link­
ing it up with a convergence of social, political, 
and economic values. The comments and analyses con­
tained in this chapter have been mainly of a non- 
empirical nature and have centered on the theoretical 
aspects of Rostow's theory--generally neglecting any 
sort of empirical testing.
Perhaps the most widespread criticism of Pro­
fessor Rostow's theory has been that in it he has not 
defined his concepts and theoretical framework in a 
sufficiently rigorous manner. It has been felt that 
some of the words and definitions he used in the expo­
sition of his theory can be given several different 
interpretations. In addition, many of Professor Ros­
tow's critics have felt that his theoretical structure 
was too "loose," and that in some of the aspects of 
his theory he stated causal relationships in both 
aggregate and sectoral terms, and then neglected,in 
any later part of his writings to tie these two 
explanations together.
Professor Rostow's critics feel that he has not 
offered clearly enough defined criteria for the defi­
nition and dating of his historical stages and that 
the absence of such criteria enables him to classify 
historical periods nearly at will in a manner which 
cannot be readily corroborated by other economic
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historians. Also, Rostov's theory implies that eco­
nomic growth assumes an automatic, continuous course 
once the take-off stage has been completed. A number 
of his critics take issue with this and feel that in 
some cases the take-off may prove abortive, and that 
in others the economy of a country may flutter around 
as if about to take-off without ever doing so. They 
question whether once the one or two critical decades 
of the take-off are over a society can rely on auto­
matic growth to carry it forward into the following 
stages.
Some of Rostow's critics express doubt that 
the take-off stage can be distinguished from the 
stage preceding it or the one following it by means 
of any sort of definite "discontinuity" (i.e., such 
as a rapid change in the proportionate size of the 
investment sector in a nation's economy) in the manner 
suggested by Rostow. Instead, they feel that gradual 
changes are more probable.
Professor Kant feels it important that Rostow 
ignored in his theory the inhibition that capital for­
mation in underdeveloped nations may suffer due to the 
demonstration effect on consumption patterns--especially 
during periods of rapid income redistribution and 
growth. He also points out that Rostow gives very 
little attention to the problem of unemployment during
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the take-off. This is important because, as the growth 
of capital becomes a built-in feature of the take-off 
economy, the productive process becomes more and more 
capital-intensive, producing a rise in the marginal 
productivity of labor and an increase in the amount 
of unemployment. The effect of this unemployment,
Kant feels, is to reduce the rate of capital forma­
tion to a level below that consistent with the social 
optimal rate of growth.
Professor Meier considers it unlikely that 
the "cultural" contexts in many of today's poor 
nations are as favorable to economic development as 
they were in the now developed nations before their 
take-offs, and he feels that this deserves a fuller 
treatment than Rostow's analysis provides. Professors 
Habakkuk and Hagen praise specific aspects of Rostow's 
analysis suggesting that they provide "penetrating 
insights," Professor Ohlin finds Rostow's treatment 
of traditional and transitional societies useful and 
rewarding, but he rejects Rostow's "smart and snappy 
take-off" as being anything other than the "old 
Industrial Revolution in a streamlined version,"
While Professor Cairncross feels that Profes­
sor Rostow's historical stages theory does little 
in helping to understand "the sweep of modern history," 
Professor Baudet believes in the general validity of
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Rostow's màin theses to the extent that nations of 
our own culture are concerned. Baudet feels, however, 
that Rostow's ideas of the non-Western world and of 
the depths of its problems are fundamentally short­
sighted and erroneous.
Professor Rostow has made a great impact in 
the field of development economics with his historical 
stages theory. Although most of the comments in this 
chapter dealt with the theoretical structure and sound­
ness of his theory, several pointed up the need for 
additional empirical examination. Therefore, this 
was felt to be an area in which fruitful results might 
evolve fhom additional empirical examination.
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL APPRAISALS OF PROFESSOR 
ROSTOW'S THEORY
Introduction
The method used by Professor Simon Kuznets 
of Harvard University, and others, in empirically 
examining Professor Rostow's historical stages theory 
has been to work with time series for various coun­
tries covering long periods of time. This approach 
resulted in somewhat inconclusive results for the 
reasons mentioned in Chapter I.
In this chapter, the work of Professor Kuz­
nets is discussed because he has synthesized the 
work done by others as a complement to his own 
research work in this area. Professor Rostow has 
said concerning Kuznets' examination of his theory, 
"His approach was not only more frontal, but also 
embraced many of the issues raised by others."^
W. W. Rostow (ed.), The Economics of Take- 
Off into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1968), p̂i xiv.
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Comments by Professor Kuznets
Professor Kuznets has suggested the following 
criteria for examining any historical stages theory of 
economic development:
1) A specific stage must exhibit empirically
, testable characteristics common to all, or 
to an important group of, units experiencing 
economic growth;
2 ) The features of a given stage must be dis­
tinctive in that, not necessarily singly 
but in combination, they are unique to that 
stage. A mere precedence, or succession, 
in time can not suffice;
3) The analytical relationship to the preced­
ing stage must be indicated--this involves 
something more than saying that the pre­
ceding stage is one of preparation for the 
given stage;
4) The analytical relationship to the suc­
ceeding stage must also be indicated;
5) The final requirement is for a delineation 
of the universe for which the generality 
of common and distinctive characteristics 
is claimed, and for which the analytical 
relationships of a given stage with the
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preceding and succeeding ones are being 
2formulated.
Based on these criteria, and his research 
efforts, Professor Kuznets makes several observations. 
First, he feels that Professor Rostow does an inade­
quate job of distinguishing the characteristics of 
modern economic growth which differentiate it from the 
traditional and other types of growth. Some of the 
characteristics Kuznets suggests for this purpose are: 
a high, sustained rate of increase in real product per 
capita, usually accompanied by a high and sustained 
rate of population increase; major shifts in the indus­
trial structure of the product and labor force, and in 
the location of the population, commonly referred to 
as industrialization and urbanization; changes in the 
organizational units under whose guidance economic 
activity takes place; a rise in the proportion of 
capital formation to national product; and shifts in 
the structure of consumer expenditures, accompanying
3urbanization and higher incomes per capita.
In addition. Professor Kuznets questions 
whether the characteristics Professor Rostow uses in
2Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure : 
Selected Essays (New York: W. ¥. Norton & Company,
1965), pp. 215-216.
^Ibid. , p. 213.
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defining the take-off stage are sufficiently distinc­
tive, Professor Kuznets asks:
How distinctive are these characteristics?
Do they occur in combination only in the take-off 
stage and in no other stage, particularly the 
preceding transition, or pre-conditions, stage 
and the succeeding self-sustained growth, or drive 
to maturity, stage? Professor Rostow is not 
explicit on this point. Presumably a rise in the 
investment proportion from 5 to 10 percent or more 
does not occur in the transition stage. Yet much 
of what Professor Rostow would attribute to the 
take-off has already occurred in the pre-conditions stage.4
Thus, Professor Kuznets feels that, given Pro­
fessor Rostow's "fuzziness" in defining the take-off 
stage and in formulating its distinctive characteris­
tics, he has not succeeded in delimiting the analyti­
cal relationships between the take-off stage and the 
preceding and succeeding stages.^ Also, Kuznets feels 
that Rostow's analysis of the take-off and pre­
conditions stages neglects the effect of historical 
heritage, the time of entry into the process of modern 
economic growth, the degree of backwardness, and other 
relevant factors concerning the characteristics of the 
early phases of modern economic growth in different 
traditional cultures.^
4Ibid.. p. 217. 
^Ibid., p. 218. 
^Ibid.. p. 232.
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Professor Kuznets states that, based on his 
research, the aggregative data fail to reveal the 
characteristics claimed by Professor Rostow as typical 
of the take-off stage; and, thus, serious doubt is 
cast on the validity of Rostow's definition of the 
take-off as a general stage of modern economic growth, 
as distinct from the pre-conditions stage and the
7self-sustained-growth stage following it. Kuznets
did not find evidence confirming "the doubling of
capital investment proportions and the implicit sharp
acceleration in the rate of growth of national product,
claimed by Professor Rostow as characterizing his
otake-off periods."
What Professor Kuznets' evidence indicates, 
then, is that the data he studied do not lend support 
to Professor Rostow's characterization of the take­
off stage. Kuznets says, though, that, "the evi­
dence used to test Professor Rostow's scheme is not 
conclusive."^




Empirical Studies by Professor Kuznets 
and Others
One of the most readily tested aspects of 
Professor Rostov's theory is his statement that during 
the take-off stage, capital formation rises from some­
what less than 5 per cent of national income to 10 per 
10cent or more. The importance of these percentages 
is that a rate of 5 per cent is ndt much more than 
enough to offset population growth for many countries 
and, thus, hold per capita income constant, while a 
rate of 10 per cent or more seems to be enough to per­
mit a satisfactory rate of rise in per capita income.
Professor Kuznets prepared a summary of the 
available information for various countries concern­
ing long-term trends in the ratio of capital formation
12to national income. In compiling this informa­
tion he acknowledges having drawn heavily on the
W. ¥. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth; 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, i960), pT 39.
^^Ibid., p. 41.
12Simon S. Kuznets, "Quantitative Aspects of 
the Economic Growth of Nations; VI. Long-Term Trends 
in Capital Formation Proportions," Economic Develop­
ment and Cultural Change, Vol. IX, No. 5^ Part II 
(July, 1961). This is the sixth of a series of mono­
graphs on economic growth prepared by Professor Kuz­
nets, each published in separate covers as the second 
part of an issue of Economic Development and Cultural 
Chance.
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work done by others in this field. Among those he 
acknowledges are; Miss Phyllis Deane of the Depart­
ment of Applied Economics, Cambridge University, 
England; Professor Jean Marczewski of the Institut 
des Sciences Economiques Appliquées of Paris, France; 
Professor Walther Hoffmann of the University of Muii- 
ster, Germany; Professor A, Giannone of the Institute 
Centrale di Statistica, Rome, Italy; Mr. Kjeld Bjerke 
of the Statistical Department, Denmark; Mr. Juul 
Bjerke of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Norway;
Dr. Osten Johannson of the University of Stockholm, 
Sweden; Mr. N. 6 . Butlin of the Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia; Professor Henry 
Rosovsky of the University of California, for his 
estimates of capital formation in Japan; and Mr. D. G. 
Franzsen and Mr. J. J. D. Willers of the Union of 
South Africa.
This study by Professor Kuznets is perhaps 
the most complete survey, and accumulation of data, 
presently available that deals with long-term trends 
in the ratio of capital formation to national income. 
Even so, in this study estimates are not available 
covering early periods for countries other than England, 
Thus, with the exception of England, there is no
^^Ibid.. p .  3.
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information as to how low the rate of capital forma­
tion was during periods before those which Professor
l4Rostow designates as the take-off. For later peri­
ods , though, data are available for seven of the 
thirteen countries for which Rostow provides "tenta­
tive, approximate take-off d a t e s . I n  Canada 
("take-off, 1896-1914"), the percentage data for capi­
tal formation behave much as Rostow's theory would sug­
gest; but for the United States, these data are avail­
able beginning only in I869, after the take-off had 
supposedly ended according to Rostow's dates ("take­
off, 1843-1860"). In Germany ("take-off, I85O-I873") 
the ratio of net domestic capital formation to net 
national product was already 8.4 per cent in the earli­
est period for which data are available, I85I-I86O, 
and had reached 11.6 per cent by I87I-I88O; and so it 
would seem that the rise in capital formation from 5 
per cent to 10 per cent of national income most likely 
required a longer time than the take-off period sug­
gested by Rostow.
For Great Britain ("take-off, 1783-1802") 
the estimates Professor Kuznets presents for periods
Everett E, Hagen, On the Theory of Social 
Change; How Economic Growth~~Begins (Homewood. Illinois 
Dorsey Press, I967), p. 319.
I5Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Table
1, p. 38.
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before I8OO are available only for England and Wales. 
Bearing this in mind, the ratio of net national capi­
tal formation to net national product for periods in 
the eighteenth century is: 1700-1740, 4 per cent;
I740-I77O, 5*5 per cent; 1770-1800, 6,5 per cent. In 
later periods, for the United Kingdom, the ratio con­
tinued to rise slowly; and it did not reach 10 per 
cent until the period l860-l869« Thus, the change 
suggested by Professor Rostow appears to have required 
about a century.
For Sweden ("take-off, I868-I89O") the data 
are presented only on a "gross" basis. On the assump­
tion sometimes used by Professor Kuznets that net 
capital formation be considered 60 per cent of gross 
capital formation, net capital formation was already 
5*5 per cent of the national product in the i860's.
It then rose slowly and irregularly during the next 
eighty years and did not become 10 per cent of the 
national product until the 1930's, seventy years 
after the time Professor Rostow postulated as the 
beginning of Sweden’s take-off period.
Data for Japan ("take-off, I878-I9OO") are 
available beginning only in I887. The ratio of net 
capital formation to national product was 6.7 per cent 
in the decade I887-I896, and it did not reach 10
80
per cent until after World War
In Argentina ("take-off, 1935- "), except
during World War I, the ratio of capital formation to 
national product was considerably above 10 per cent 
from 1900 to 1930, before the beginning of the take­
off period suggested for it by Professor Rostow, Dur­
ing the depression of the 1930's and World War II the 
ratio of capital formation to national product fell 
below 10 per cent; and, then, in the decade 1945-195^ 
it rose to 11.5 per cent.
It seems difficult to interpret the data for 
these countries in a way that offers support for Pro­
fessor Rostow's take-off thesis. Similarly, the data 
for other countries presented by Professor Kuznets in 
this study fail to support Rostow's theory. The 
available evidence seems to suggest gradual change from 
an early period onward, rather than a movement in
17stages.
The ratios are those for net domestic capi­
tal formation to net national product. The ratios 
for net national capital formation to net national 
product are slightly lower in the decade I887-I896 
and considerably lower after World War I.
17Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, pp. 519-
520.
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Comments Conc e r n i n g  this Approach
The approach used by Professor Kuznets and 
others is by far the simplest and most direct method 
of examining Professor Rostow's histbrical stages 
theory. It is also the method which most readily 
comes to mind as a means of examining Rostow's theory.
The major difficulty encountered in using
this method has been the scarcity of data covering
the early time periods of the countries examined.
As an illustration of this, Professor Hoffmann has
said in reference to his study of the German economy,
"For want of material the subject can be dealt with
18only from I85O onwards." Similarly, Professor 
Cairncross in discussing the economies of the United 
States and the United Kingdom has stated, . . the
record does not cover in any adequate way the period 
of take-off and so does not relate to any sudden 
acceleration in the rate of economic g r o w t h . A l s o ,  
Professor Cairncross, in discussing those countries 
for which we do have some sort of historical data, 
says, " . . .  have we an adequate basis for generaliza­
tion? The relevant data relate mainly to a dozen 
countries or so over the past century or two. Even
^^Rostow (ed.). The Economics of Take-Off into 
Sustained Growth, p. II3.
^ ^ I b i d . . p. 249.
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for this dozen countries, the key statistics, until
20comparatively recently, are highly imperfect."
20A. K, Cairncross, "The Stages of Economic 
Growth," Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 
XIII, No. 3 (April, 1961), p. ^53i
PART III
THE PRESENT STUDY AND ITS RESULTS
CHAPTER V
THE SELECTION OF COUNTRIES AND SCOPE 
OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Introduction
The take-off stage is generally considered 
to be the most crucial and original aspect of Pro­
fessor Rostow's historical stages theory. In the 
present study an attempt was made to examine empiri­
cally a number of aspects of Professor Rostow's theory; 
but, eventually, due to difficulties associated with 
the quality of the data, it narrowed down to an 
examination of several of the most important points 
in Rostow's formulation of the take-off stage, and 
of several lesser points concerning other aspects 
of his theory.
The present chapter contains general background 
material concerning the study which was conducted, and 
Chapters VI and VII deal with the salient aspects of 
empirical examinations of two of Professor Rostow's 
major "requirements" which must be satisfied in order 
for the take-off stage to occur. The results of an
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examination of an aspect of Professor Rostow's theory 
concerning the drive-to-maturity stage are mentioned 
in the last part of Chapter VI. In Chapter VIII are 
the results of a line of research, suggested in some 
of Professor Kuznets' writings, examining the rural 
and urban population aspects associated with economic 
development for the sample countries of the present 
study.
While previous examinations of Professor 
Rostow's theory, and of his take-off stage in par­
ticular, have attempted to use long-term data covering 
one or more centuries, this study examines the seven­
teen year span of United Nations national income 
accounts data now available for many of the countries 
in the world. Since Professor Rostow's take-off stage 
lasts only a brief time— in most cases about 20 years—  
an analysis of this seventeen year span of data is 
used as a means of examining Professor Rostow's theory, 
and especially his take-off concept. In the present 
study the data have been examined in detail for those 
countries which now seem to be passing through Pro­
fessor Rostow's take-off stage.
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Why Professor El-Kammash's Ranking of 
Countries Was Chosen
For the purpose of this study, a large propor­
tion of the countries in the world were selected as a 
sample and ranked according to level of economic 
development, in expectation that the countries along 
this ranking would fall into Professor Rostow's vari­
ous stages of economic development. Further, if Pro­
fessor Rostow's statements concerning the take-off 
stage are correct, a group of countries somewhere 
along this ranking should display properties similar 
to those specified by him as belonging to the take­
off stage.
A number of studies that ranked nations 
according to level of economic development were 
examined before selecting one which was considered 
most satisfactory in terms of the needs of the present 
study. The one chosen was Professor Magdi M. El- 
Kammash's, "On the Measurement of Economic Development 
Using Scalogram Analysis."^ This study was chosen for 
two reasons. First, based on recent data, it ranked a 
reasonably large number of countries in order according
Magdi M. El-Kammash, "On the Measurement of 
Economic Development Using Scalogram Analysis," Papers 
and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 
Vol. XI (1963), pp. 309-334.
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to their level of economic development. Second, it 
was more sophisticated, and took more factors into 
consideration, in its ranking of countries than most 
of the other studies which might have been chosen. 
Thus, to the extent that reasonably accurate and com­
plete United Nations data are available, the countries 
examined in the present study are those discussed in 
Professor El-Kammash's article.
Based on United Nations population estimates 
for 1967, the 49 countries ranked in Professor El- 
Kammash's study contain slightly more than half of the 
world's population, while the 46 of these countries 
examined in Chapter VI--and the 47 examined in Chapter
VII--of the present study account for somewhat more
2than one third of the world's population. No other 
study examining the validity of Professor Rostow's 
theory was found which examines such an ambitious 
sample of the countries in the world.
Selection and Ordering of Countries
While at the Department of Economics of Duke 
University, Professor El-Kaimnash completed a study in
2Calculated using data from. United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook. 196? (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, I968).
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which he ranked 49 countries according to degree of 
economic development on the basis of the following 
variables: 1) infant mortality rates, 2) degree of
illiteracy, 3) gross capital formation as a percentage 
of gross national product in 1955j and 4) share of the 
agricultural sector (agriculture, forestry, and fish-
oing) in gross domestic product in 1955* Using these 
four variables, the countries were grouped into five 
successive categories of economic development, "based 
on the total scores of scaling," the ordering of 
countries within each category being based on per 
capita national product averaged over the years 1952- 
1954.^ The number of countries ranked in order of 
economic development was limited to 49 because of the 
unavailability of satisfactory data on these four 
variables for additional countries.
In choosing an index of economic development, 
one is faced with a choice between using a single 
variable index or with using the multivariate approach. 
The first approach is less satisfactory because the 
index is concerned not with the measurement of economic 
development, but rather with indicating changes in the 
one variable included in the model--changes that may
^El-kammash, pp. 316-317» 
^Ibid. , p, 321,
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or may not reflect changes in economic development.
While scaling techniques were initially 
devised to solve the problems of attitude measurement 
and public opinion, and particularly to determine 
the dimensions implied in a set of items, they can 
also be applied to the problem of measuring economic 
development. Scaling techniques are particularly well 
adapted to this purpose, because the data obtained 
from underdeveloped countries are generally unreliable. 
Although the data which are used to describe economic 
development appear as percentages and rates, they may 
be considered semi-qualitative because of the large 
margins of error involved in the process of collecting 
them.^
There are many variables which might be con­
sidered relevant to economic development, but many of 
these variables are not completely independent of each 
other. For example, in the case of infant mortality 
rates and crude death rates, the former are evidently 
related to the latter; but since including both vari­
ables would probably not seem desirable, the former 
might be selected on the grounds that they are more 
sensitive to changes in the level of economic devel­
opment. Also, the availability of data is a limiting
^Ibid., pp. 312-315.
90
factor to be considered in the selection of variables
6to be included in the construction of a scale.
Thus, the criteria adopted by Professor El- 
Kammash in the selection of variables were:
1) the sensitivity to register the changes in 
the degree of economic development, and
2) the availability of data.^
On the basis of these criteria, four variables 
were selected:
1) Infant mortality rates (M), This demo­
graphic factor is the number of deaths of 
infants under one year of age per thousand 
born alive in 1955. Infant mortality was 
chosen because it represents more demographic 
aspects than crude death rates. Besides 
reflecting the health situation of the com­
munity, infant mortality is related to birth 
rates which are known to be closely associ­
ated with economic development. Infant 
mortality rates also generally vary inversely 
with economic development.
2) Degree of illiteracy, as represented by the 
percentage of population 15 years and over 
which was illiterate in the latest census 
since 19^7 (I). This factor contributes
to and is affected by economic development 
to a great extent. The higher the country 
rises in the ladder of development, the 
wider education spreads among its people.
But there is a difficulty which arises from 
the differences in the criteria used to 
define literacy from one country to another.
^Ibid. , pp. 3X5-316. 
^Ibid. , p. 3l6 .
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In sonie places it is considered thé ability 
to read, in others the ability to write, 
while in a number of cases both reading 
and writing are necessary. theie is also 
no agreement on the segment of population 
to be included. In some countries it is 
taken to be the population from age 5 to 
65, in others it is 15 to 65. However, 
the figures were taken as they were because 
the dichotomy will not be significantly 
different if adjustments be made to make 
the data comparable.
3 ) Gross capital formation, as a percentage 
of gross national product in 1955 (C).
This is an important variable, which reflects 
the increase in income caused by economic 
development. It is always argued that 
economic development depends to a great 
extent upon the saving habits of the people. 
The aggregate for this variable was taken 
and not the per capita values. The reason 
for this procedure is that our concern is 
the long term trend in capital formation 
unaffected by changes in the size of popu­
lation. Our assumption is that the more 
the country is developed, the higher will 
be aggregate capital formation.
4) Share of agricultural sector (agriculture, 
forestry and fishing) in gross domestic 
product in 1955 (A) for most underdeveloped 
countries are agricultural economies. This 
variable reflects the urbanization factor, 
and the change from industries dependent on 
agriculture to non-agricultural industries.
It is considered that the more the country 
is developed, the smaller is the share of 
agricultural sector in gross domestic pro­
duct . 8
Data on these four variables were collected 
for 49 countries. Although in most cases the data for 
these 49 countries were sufficient, in some cases
®Ibid., pp. 316-317.
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estimates had to be made for unavailable data. It 
was decided to divide the data into two mutually 
exclusive groups in the manner shown in Table 1.
To decide on the various points of division between 
these two mutually exclusive groups, the range for 
each variable was taken, and an arbitrary point was 
chosen which fell in the middle of that range. In 
Table 1, "0" designates those characteristics which 
show underdevelopment, and "1" designates those which 
show development. Similarly, the same designations
Qare used in Table 2.
In Table 2, the results of scaling provided 
a classification of the 49 countries into five cate­
gories ranging from highly developed countries (those 
with a total score of 4) to those which are underde­
veloped (those with a total score of O), as can be 
found in the next to the last column. Based on these 
scores, ranging from O to 4, the countries are divided 
into five categories, or levels, of development (see 
the last column of Table 2). The countries having the 
highest possible total score (4) are classified as 
falling in the highest category of development (V), 
and those having the lowest possible total score (O) 
are classed as falling in the lowest category of
^Ibid.. p. 317.
TABLE 1
A DIVISION INTO TWO GROUPS USED IN SCORING




LOW RATES HIGH RATES
Infant mortality rates (M) Below 50 infant deaths per 
1000 born alive
50 and above per 1000
LOW DEGREE OF ILLITERACY HIGH DEGREE OF ILLITERACY
Degree of illiteracy (l) Less than 35 per cent of 
the people illiterate
35 per cent and above of 
the people illiterate
LOW PERCENTAGE HIGH PERCENTAGE
Share of agricultural 
sector in Gross Domestic 
Product (A)
Share of agricultural 
sector in Gross Domestic 
Product less than 30 per 
cent
Share of agricultural sector 
in Gross Domestic Product 
30 per cent and over
HIGH PERCENTAGE LOW PERCENTAGE
Capital formation as a 
percentage of Gross 
National Product (C)
Percentage ratio of Gross 
Capital Formation to 
Gross National Product 
15 per cent and over
Percentage ratio of Gross 
Capital Formation to Gross 
National Product less than 
15 per cent
VO
Reproduced from: Magdi M. El-Kammash, "On the Measurement of Economic
Development Using Scalogram Analysis," Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science 
Association. XI (I963), Table III, p. 318.
TABLE 2









M I A C
1. United States 1 1 1 1 4 V
2. Canada 1 1 1 1 4 V
3. Switzerland 1 1 1 1 4 V
4. New Zealand 1 1 1 1 4 V
5. Sweden 1 1 1 1 4 V
6. Australia 1 1 1 1 4 V
7- Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 4 V
8. Belgium 1 1 1 1 4 V
9. United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 4 V
10. Denmark 1 1 1 1 4 V
11. Norway 1 1 1 1 4 V
12. France 1 1 1 1 4 V
13. Finland 1 1 1 1 4 V
l4. Germany (West) 1 1 1 1 4 V
15. Netherlands 1 1 1 1 4 V
16. Austria 1 1 1 1 4 V









M I A c
18. Argentina 0 1 1 1 3 IV
19. Puerto Rico 0 1 1 1 3 IV
20. Italy 0 1 1 1 3 IV
21. Venezuela 0 0 1 1 2 III
22. Chile 0 1 1 0 2 III
23. Union of South Africa 0 0 1 1 2 III
24. Yugoslavia 0 1 0 1 2 III
25. Costa Rica 0 1 0 1 2 III
26. Peru 0 0 1 1 2 III
27. Bolivia 0 0 1 1 2 III
28. Spain 0 1 0 1 2 III-
29. Brazil 0 0 0 1 1 II
30. Mexico 0 0 0 1 1 II
31. Portugal 0 0 1 0 1 II
32. Ecuador 0 0 0 1 1 II
33. Thailand 0 0 0 1 1 II
34. Burma 0 0 0 1 1 II











DevelopmentM I A c
36. Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 I
37» Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 I
38. Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 I
39. Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 I
40. Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 I
4l. Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 I
42. U.A.R. (Egypt) 0 0 0 0 0 I
43. Ceylon 0 0 0 0 0 I
44. El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 I
45. Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 I
46. India 0 0 0 0 0 I
47. Korea (South) 0 0 0 0 0 I
48. Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 I
49. Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0 I
vOo\
Source : Adapted from Magdi M. El-Kammash, "On the Measurement
of Economic Development Using Scalogram Analysis," Papers and Pro­
ceedings of the Regional Science Association, XI (1963), Table IV, 
p. 319, and Table V, p. 321.
M: Infant Mortality I :
A: Share of Agricultural C:
Sector in Gross Domestic 
Pr o due t
Degree of Illiteracy
Capital Formation as a 
Percentage of Gross National Product
Indicates Development 0 ; Indicates Underdevelopment
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development (l).
For example, taking the case of the United 
States, the first country listed in Table 2, the 
country was given a "1" for each of the "Development 
Characteristics," The United States had a low rate of 
infant mortality (M) and so it was given a "1" in this 
column of Table 2 . It also had a low level of illiter­
acy (l), a low share of agricultural sector in Gross 
Domestic Product (A), and a high share of capital 
formation as a percentage of Gross National Product 
(C), Thus, it was given a "1" in each of these cate­
gories also. The "l*s" for the four vertical columns 
M, I, A, and C for the United States add up to the 
total of "4," placing it in the highest category 
according to level of economic development (Category 
V).
Conversely, in the case of the Mauritius, 
the last country listed in Table 2, the country was 
given a "0" for each of the "Development Characteris­
tics." Thus, the total score for the four vertical 
columns M, I, A, and C is"0," placing it in the lowest 
category, according to level of economic development 
(Category l).
In this manner, a total score of 3 for the 
"Development Characteristics" would place a country 
in Category IV of development, a total score of 2 would
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place it in Category III of development, and a total 
score of 1 would place it in Category II of development.
In Table 2 , as might be expected, l6 of the 
17 countries in Professor El-Kammash's Category V of 
economic development are modern. Western nations, the 
exception being Japan, an Asian nation. Two of the 3 
countries in his Category IV are from Latin America, 
and the other is from southern Europe. Five of the 8 
countries in his Category III are from Latin America,
2 are from Europe, and 1 is from Africa.
While 1 of the 7 countries in his Category II 
is from Europe (Portugal), the remaining 6 are from 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The l4 countries in 
his Category I are a diversity from Asia, the Middle 
East, Latin America, and Africa.
Countries belonging to the same category of 
development do, to a great extent, share similar lev­
els of technology, education, and standard of living; 
yet, there are differences between these countries with 
respect to how far they have utilized these capacities. 
This shows up in the outcome of their efforts, that 
is, in such things as per capita national product or 
per capita national income. Thus, in Table 2, the 
countries were grouped into the categories of economic 
development on the basis of the total scores of scaling. 
The ordering within each group of countries, though.
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was then based on the average of 1952-195^ per capita 
national product--when estimates of per capita national 
product were not available, the countries were placed 
at the ends of their respective groups. Per capita 
national product was chosen rather than per capita 
. national income because of the greater availability 
of data,^®
Professor El-Kammash*s Categories and 
Professor Rostow's Stages
The countries which Professor El-Kammash classi­
fied into various categories of economic development do 
not necessarily correspond with the equivalent stages 
of Professor Rostow's classification (see Figure l), 
since the selection of limits for Professor Rostow's 
stages and Professor El-Kammash's categories are 
based on different criteria. For example, few of 
the countries in the world today seem to exhibit the 
characteristics of Professor Rostow's "traditional 
society" s t a g e . T h u s ,  in all probability Professor 
El-Kammash's "Category I" does not exactly coincide 
with Professor Rostow's lowest category. This probable
l°ïbid.. pp. 318-321.
Andre Gunder Frank, Rostow's Stages of Eco­
nomic Growth through Escalation to Nuclear Destruction 
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Note: This Figure is intended to illustrate the
fact that Professor Rostov's stages and Professor El- 
Kammash 's categories do not necessarily coincide, since 
the selection of their limits is based on different 
criteria.
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disparity between Professor Rostow's stages and 
Professor El-Kammash's categories is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The relationship between Professor Rostow's 
stages and Professor El-Kammash's categories may not 
be exactly of the sort illustrated in Figure 1 , but 
the proportional relationships illustrated in Figure 1 
seem a likely possibility, for Professor El-Kammash's 
49 countries.
Figure 1 has been drawn to indicate that, for 
the countries in the world today, Professor Rostow's 
lowest three stages of development (his traditional 
society, preconditions, and take-off stages) may 
roughly coincide with Professor El-Kammash's lowest 
category of development (his Category I) and part of 
his next highest category of development (his Category
II). This is likely because of the briefness of the 
take-off stage and because few countries in the world 
today seem to be in Professor Rostow's traditional 
society stage. This leaves, then. Professor Rostow's 
highest two stages of development (his age of high 
mass-consumption and drive to maturity stages) cor­
responding approximately with Professor El-Kammash's 
Categories V, IV, III, and part of Category II.
The bracketing, in Figure 1, of varying propor­
tions of the countries into Professor El-Kammash's
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different categories is based on the proportions of 
the 49 countries in Table 2 that fall into these dif­
ferent categories; while the bracketing, in Figure 1, 
of varying proportions of the countries into Professor 
Rostow's different stages is subjective and open to 
question. The appropriate matching of Professor El- 
Kammash 's categories and Professor Rostow's stages 
for the sample countries, as theorized in Figure 1, 
is not crucial for the purposes of this study. What 
is important is that the sample countries are ranked 
according to level of economic development. It seems 
reasonable to expect that the countries lower in this 
ranking fall into Professor Rostow's lower stages while 
those higher in the ranking fall into his higher 
stages, and this study examines the available data in 
an attempt to see if a "cluster" of countries near the 
bottom of the ranking exhibit characteristics which 
Professor Rostow attributes to his take-off stage.
Approach and Scope of the Present Study
In the following chapters of the present study, 
most, but not all, of the 49 countries ordered in 
Table 2 are used. The availability and accuracy of 
the data vary as different types of data are studied; 
so, depending on the availability of data for the 
particular aispect of Professor Rostow's theory being
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examined, some of these 49 countries are used at some 
times, while others are used at other times. Although 
some additional information is now available which was 
not available when Professor El-Kammash originally 
ranked his 49 countries according to level of economic 
development, his procedure was not repeated for these 
few additional countries because of the complexity 
and difficulty which would have been encountered in 
fitting additional countries into his ranking.
The approach of this study is to examine the 
seventeen year span of United Nations national income 
accounts data available for most of the 49 countries 
Professor El-Kammash ranked according to level of 
economic development. In general, "gross" national 
accounts data are used rather than "net" national 
accounts data because of greater reliability and avail­
ability. Although the quality of the United Nations 
data used in this study was judged adequate to indi­
cate broad trends and patterns, it was felt, because 
of the quality limitations of the data, nothing 
additional would have been gained by attempting to 
adjust the gross data to approximate net data.
Quality of the Data
The primary source of data for this study con­
sists of various issues of the United Nations Yearbook
10k
of National Accounts Statistics issued since World War 
II. For some countries the United Nations national 
income accounts data have a high degree of reliability, 
while for other countries the reliability of the data 
is considerably less, usually the lowest reliability 
being associated with data for the least developed 
countries.
A great deal of effort has been exerted by
the United Nations to facilitate the international
comparability of the National Accounts data found in
various issues of its Yearbook of National Accounts
Statistics, and the international comparability of this
12data is constantly improving. Further information 
concerning the compilation and comparability of the 
data found in various issues of the United Nations 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics is available 
in National Accounting Practices in Sixty Countries ;
A Supplement to the Yearbook of National Accounts Sta­
tistics.^^
In spite of the drawbacks, the data presently 
available appear sufficiently reliable to perform the
TOUnited Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1966 (New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, 196?), p. vii.
13United Nations, National Accounting Practices 
in Sixty Countries : A Supplement to the Yearbook of
National Accounts Statistics (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, 1964),
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tests intended and to give a broad picture of what 
is happening in a large part of the world.
CHAPTER VI
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE
OF EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT,
SELECTED COUNTRIES
Introduction
In this chapter two aspects of Professor Rostow’s 
historical stages theory are examined. A major aspect 
dealing with his critical take-off stage is dealt with
in the first part of the chapter. Then, a lesser aspect
dealing with his drive-to-maturity stage is dealt with
in the second part of the chapter. Both of these
aspects have been included in this chapter, because 
their examination utilizes some of the same data.
The take-off stage is the first major concept 
of Professor Rostow's historical stages theory which 
he described in his lectures and journal articles.
Also, it is the "keystone" around which he built his 
theory. Because of its importance, an examination of 
this concept is of particular significance in the 
examination of Rostow's theory.
According to Professor Rostow, one of the
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major requirements--and a necessary conditiori--which 
must be fulfilled in order for the také-off stage to 
occur in a given country is :
) A rise in the rate of productive investment 
from, say, or less to over 10% of national 
income (or net national product (NNP)).l
In effect, the above statement implies a 
"doubling" in net investment as a percentage of net 
national product during the take-off stage. Professor 
Rostow's explanation of this "requirement" for the 
take-off stage stresses the importance of a sharp 
rise in investment as a proportion of net national 
product over the approximately 20 year take-off period, 
and suggests that the 5 per cent and 10 per cent fig­
ures are arbitrary and based on certain technology and
population change assumptions (e.g., population in-
2creases of approximately 1-1.5 per cent per year).
It should be noted that Professor Rostow formu­
lated this requirement in terms of net national product 
and that in speaking of "productive investment" Rostow 
is interpreted by Professor Kuznets and others to mean
1¥. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth! 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge; Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, i960), p. 39.
^Ibid., p. 41.
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3net investment. Also, Rostow here uses the two con­
cepts "national income" and "net national product" 
interchangeably.
The 17 year span of United Nations data 
available for many of the 49 countries Professor 
El-Kammash ranked according to level of economic 
development are examined in the present study to see 
if a "cluster" of countries, somewhere near the bot­
tom of this ranking, exhibit the above characteris­
tic.
In this study, investment as a percentage of 
product was calculated for as many of the 49 countries 
Professor El-Kammash ranked according to level of 
economic development, and for as many individual years 
for these countries, as satisfactory United Nations 
data could be found. After these percentages were 
calculated, a linear regression line was fitted to 
the percentages for each country and projected the 
number of additional years necessary to total a 20 
year period. The percentage change in investment as 
a percentage of product over the 20 year period for 
each of these countries was then calculated using 
these linear regression lines. A 20 year period was
3Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure: 
Selected Essays (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1965), p. 221.
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chosen for three reasons. First, this is a reasonable 
interprétation of the length of time required for 
Professor Rostow's take-off stage to occur. Second, 
with spans of data up to seventeen years in length 
available, it would require, at a minimum, a pro­
jection of only three years. Third, projecting the 
available data of each of these countries to a period 
totaling 20 years in length leads to a -'comparability" 
of the change in investment as a percentage of product 
for each of these countries because of the similarity 
of time span.
In addition, the present chapter examines 
Professor Rostow's statement that, during the drive- 
to-maturity stage, "some 10-20% of the national income 
is steadily invested, , , ," This analysis compares 
the relative magnitudes of mean values of investment 
as a percentage of product calculated from the series 
of available data for each of the countries along Pro­
fessor El-Kammash's ranking.
Both these aspects of Professor Rostow's theory 
are examined using "gross domestic fixed capital forma­
tion" as a percentage of "gross domestic product,"
Giross data are used rather than net data because of 
greater reliability and availability. Net capital
4Rostow, p, 9,
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formation data are often arbitrary and vary from coun­
try to country in the manner in which they are cal­
culated— reflecting the varying practices from country 
to country in calculating "depreciation."
Data for gross domestic product are used in 
this study rather than data for gross national product 
or data for national income because of greater avail­
ability. The trends in the data are the aspects 
intended for measurement, and the slight differences 
between these concepts do not affect the results 
of the present study.
The Procedure Used to Examine These Aspects 
of Professor Rostow's Theory
The data for gross domestic fixed capital 
formation and for gross domestic product used in exam­
ining these two aspects of Professor Rostow’s theory 
were obtained from various issues of the United Nations 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. In most 
cases, issues for the years 1957» 1958, 1959, 1961, 
1962, 1966, and 1967 were used, because no one of 
these provided the complete range of data needed.
Often, the data for a given country and year were 
available in several of the issues, but the data from 
the most recent Yearbook in which they could be found
Ill
were always used, because the United Nations data 
are continuously being revised.
The United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics defines "gross domestic product" as follows:
Gross domestic product at market prices is the 
market value of the product, before deduction of 
provisions for the consumption of fixed capital, 
attributable to factor services rendered to resi­
dent producers of the given country. It is identi­
cally equal to the sum of consumption expenditure 
and gross domestic capital formation, private and 
public, and the net exports of goods and services 
of the given country. It differs from the gross 
national product at market prices by the exclusion 
of net factor incomes received from abroad.5
Similarly, the United Nations Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics defines "gross domestic 
fixed capital formation" as follows:
Value of purchases and own-account construction 
of fixed assets (civilian construction and works, 
machinery and equipment) by enterprises (includ­
ing households in their capacity as house owners), 
private non-profit institutions and general gov­
ernment. Expenditure of a capital nature by gen­
eral government for defence (excluding civil 
defence) is treated as general government consump­
tion expenditure. Expenditure by households on 
durable goods other than new dwellings is treated 
as private consumption expenditure.
All expenses directly related to the acquisi­
tion of capital goods, such as transportation and 
installation charges, fees for engineering, archi­
tectural, legal and other services, are included. 
Indirect expenditures, including flotation costs, 
commissions and other financing costs are, on the
RUnited Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics. 1966 (New York: Statistical Office of theUnited Nations, I967), p. xi.
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other hand, regarded as current expenditures.
Expenditures on irrigation projects, flood 
control, forest clearance, land reclamation and 
improvement, etc., and on the development of 
plantations, orchards, vineyards, forests, etc., 
are included. The value of newly discovered 
mineral deposits and other natural resources is, 
on the other hand, excluded.
In principle, expenditures on repairs over and 
above what is needed to keep the capital goods in 
the state of continuous good working condition 
are included but normal repairs and maintenance 
are treated as current expenditure.
Transfer costs involved in the purchase of used 
domestic assets, including transportation costs, 
legal fees, installation expenses, etc., are part 
of fixed capital formation. Changes in work in 
progress on dwellings and non-residential buildings 
are also included.
Calculations
After the data for "gross domestic fixed capi­
tal formation" and for "gross domestic product" were 
obtained, "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as 
a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product" was calcu­
lated for those countries of Table 2, Chapter V, for 
which reasonably good data were found. Because of inade­
quate data, three countries were omitted from those in 
Table 2. One country, Spain, was eliminated from Cate­
gory III of development; and two countries, Egypt and 
India, were eliminated from Category I of development.
^Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.
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Thus, 46 countries remained of the 49 originally
listed in order of economic development in Table 2.
Based on United Nations population estimates for I967,
these 46 countries contain somewhat more than one third
7of the world's population.
For many of the countries selected for exami­
nation, enough data were available to permit the cal­
culation of percentages covering a I7 year span of 
time. For the remaining countries, data for lesser 
spans of time were available, but generally enough 
data were available to permit the calculation of per­
centages covering spans of time long enough to be use­
ful. These calculations resulted in the percentages 
contained in Table 3 , wherein 46 countries are ordered 
according to level of economic development. For a 
number of these countries, there was a changeover 
from an older series of data to a newer series of 
data; for the present study, these were labeled 
"Series A" and "Series B," respectively. Although 46 
countries are represented in Table 3 there are 56 
entries under the column labeled "Country" because of 
the "Series A" and "Series B" designations of the data.
7 Calculated using data from United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook, 1967 (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, I968).
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TABLE 3
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OP EXPENDITURE ON 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT» SELECTED COUNTRIES, I95O-I966
PP Country
Gross Domestic Pixod Capital Formation as a Percontago of Expenditure 
on Gross Domestic Producto > 0Sfai
a w  0^950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
1 A United Staten V 17.7 16.4 15.8 16.5 16.5 17.7 18.1 17.8 17.0 17.5 16.9 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.9 17.3 17.1
2 A Canada V 20.8 21.5 21.2 22.7 22.2 22.2 25.3 26.5 24.8 23.4 22.2 21.2 21.0 21.2 22.7 24.2 25.4
3 A Switzerland V 17.9(18.6)19.4 20.8 21.5 20.0 21.7 23.7 26.4 27.8 28.9 29.8 28.1 27.0
4 A New Zealand V 17.6 19.8 22.3 22.0 23.1 22.9 22.1 22.7 21.9 21.2 22.5 23.0 21.7 22.1 22.8 23.6 22.6
5 A Sweden V 18,5 18.4 19.0 20.4 20.9 19.9 19.9 19.’9 20.9 21.6 22.0 22.4 22.5 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.0
6 A Australia V 23.9 29.2 24.7 23.3 26.1 23.9 22.9 24.3 23.8 24.1 24..5 24.3 24.3 24.7 26.1 27.1 25.6
7 A Luxembourg V 23.8 16.6 17.1 23.7 22.8 21.7 19.3 23.2 23.5 22.9
7 B Luxembourg V 21.9 24.7 27.4 31.8 35.5
8 A Belgium V 13.7 14.0 16.1 16.0 17.1 18.3 17.7 16.8 17.6 18.9 20.0 20.4 19.9 21.3 21.1 21.5
9 A United Kingdom V 13.0 12.8 12.9 14.0 14.0 14.8 14.8 15.5 15.3 15.6 16.2 17.0 16.6 16.2 17.9 18.0 17.9
10 A Donmork V 16.7 17.4 18.2 17.0 16.9 16.0 16.3 16.9 17.2 18.8 19.4 20.6 20.8 19.8 21.8 21.8 21.3
11 A Norway V 24.1 26.4 30.1 29.8 30.5 27.9 28.9 32.1 29.4 28.5 29.6 29.2 29.7 27.9 28.4 28.5
12 A France V 16.2 16.8 16.6 16.3 16.3 17.8 18.1 19.3 19.2 19.0 18.6 19.7 19.7 20.1 21.2 21.7 21.8
13 A Finland V 23.5 23.7 26.7 27.3 25.7 25.5 26.0 24.3 24.8 25.5 27.3 28.0 27.4 25.7 24.4 26.0 25.4
14 A West Germany V 19.0 18.7 19.1 19.8 21.0 22.5 22.5 21.5 21.8 23.1 — — — — -- — --
l4 B West Germany V .. _ 23.8 24.7 25.4 25.2 26.3 26.3 25.4
15 A Netherlands V 20.0 19.5 18.9 21.2 21.3 22.9 25.2 25.7 22.7 23.6 23.8 24.4 24.1 23.7 25.2 24.9 25.5
16 A Austria V 19.0 20.9 19.5 17.2 20.6 22.8 21.2 21.9 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.7 24.5 24.5 24.8 25.6 26.1
17 A Japan V 16.2 19.7 20.3 22.5 20.4 20.0 24.1 27.3 26.3 27.0 31.0 34.8 34.3 32.6 33.0 31.6 31.4
18 A Argentina IV — 22.0 20.1 17.5 17.7 17.6 18.4 20.1 20.0 16.9 21.7 23.5 22.7 18.2 16.5 17.2 17.9
19 A Puerto Rico IV 16.3 17.1 17.0 17.2 19.1 18.9 20.9 20.8 20.1 20.9 20.3 21.5 21.2 23.0 25.6 23.9 25.2
20 A Italy IV 17.6 18.5 19.7 19.1 19.5 20.4 20.6 21.6 20.6 21.0 22.2 22.9 23.4 23.8 21.9 19.0 18.6
21 A Venezuela III 14.7 16.1 22.5 28.9 30.5 24.6 25.0 25.0 24.3 23.7
21 B Venezuela III 18.7 16.1 16.3 16.5 17.6 18.7 19.0
























24 A 'Yugoslavia 111 m m 30.2 32.0 32.6 28.9 28.6 27.6 29.5 30.7 32.4 34.6 35.3 34.6 33.4 27.4 25.5
25 A Costa Rica III 15.4 16.6 17.7 17.6 19.1 17.1 18.6 19.3
25 B Costa Rica III — — — — — ““ 18.6 18.5 19.4 19.0 18.0 20.9 20.9 18.3 22.7 20.3
26 A Peru III 23.7 23.2 21.0 18.5 23.3 24.8 22.9 17.8 16.8 19.2 20.6 18.8 17.1 19.3
27 A Bolivia III 14.5 13.6 14.2 10.9 15.7 16.1 14.8 14.4 11.7
28 A Brazil 11 18.1 li’4 13.0 16.4 14.3 13.2 13.1 13.8 15.9 16.5 17.2 16.3 16.5 14.3 10.7 12.8
29 A Mexico II 13.8(14.0)14.3 16.7 16.5 14.7 14.2 14.9 14.5 13.8 14.4 16.1 15.8 16.5
30 A Portugal II -- — 14.0 13.8 14.3 13.5 13.8 14.5 15.7 16.0 17.3 17.5 16.6 17.9 17.1 17.3 18.5
31 A Ecuador II 8.5 11.0 9.1 10.7 13.2 13.9 13.8 13.0 12.3 13.3 -- _ __ _
31 B Ecuador II 13.4 13.6 12.2 12.3 : 2. ') 11.9
32 A Thailand II 14.4 14.2 13.3 13.1
32 B Thailand 11 14.0 13.7 14.3 14.9 15.6 18.2 21.6 22.3 22.6 22.3
33 A Burma II 10.5 11.7 14.9 14.5 18.2 20.0 21.2 20.8 20.7 17.9 15.9 15.0 15.7 16.5 15.7 — --
34 A Morocco II 22.9 24.4 18.3 18.2 14.2 11.2 9.6 10.0 9.2 10.1 11.6 10.8 11.9 11.1 11.0
35 A Malaysia I 6.2 6.6 10.3 10.0 (9.6) 9.2 11.0 12.3 11.8 10.5 12.3 14.8 17.7 17.6 17.0 16.6
35 A Colombia I 8.5 9.7 10.1 10.9 10.5 10.1 10.3 8.4
36 B Colombia I 16.6 16.9 18.0 17.0 14.8 16.1 16.6 18.3 18.4 18.2 17.1 16.7 15.9
37 A Turkey I 9.4 10.2 12.5 12.1 14.4 14.4 13.8 12.7 12.7 13.9 14.7 14.5 14.4 13.8 13.4 13.6 14.9
38 A Guatemala I 8.1 (9.0) 9.8 14.9 16)0 14.1 11.4 10.1 14.4 9.9 10.3 12.1 12.5 12.3
39 A Philippines I 7.3 6.6 6.4 6.9 6.8 7.1 8.1 8.8 8.1 8.2 9.9 12.8 12.5 12.9 14.4 13.6
40 A Honduras I 10.8 12.4 16.2 16.0 12.9 13.3 12.6 13.7 12.7 11.9 12.7 11.0 13.2 14.5 13.9 13.5 13.7
41 A Ceylon I 8.7 9.3 12.0 10.1 8.7 9.8 15.1
41 B Ceylon I — — — — 15.9 15.6 14.6 14.3 14.6 14.9 14.1 12.9 14.1
42 A El Salvador I 11.9 11.9 l4.4 11.6 11.8 11.9 14.1 14.9 15.4
43 A Pakistan 1 9.2 11.8 13.9 15.6 17.0 17.2 14.6
44 A South Korea I 7.3 1 ;. ; 10.2 10.3 10.7 10.1 11.0 10.8 11.7 14.1 14.0 11.6 14.7 20.2
45 A Nigeria I 6.4 8.6 8.6 9.0 10.1 11.2 12.0
45 B Nigeria I — -- — — — -- — — 12.6 13.6 l4.0 14.5 13.9 14.6 16.0 -- --
46 A Mauritius I 14.7 14.4 13.0 15.4 12.8 13.9 12.0 13.4 16.7 16.6 21.9 18.7 17.1 15.0 19.1 16.8 14.6
( ) Designates data calculated by averaging the data for tho year Immediately preceding, and the yoar Imme­
diately following, a year for which no data were available.
-- Reliable data not available (For this series of data)
• The percentages for Yugoslavia were calculated using "Expenditure on Gross Material Product," o some­
what similar, but not strictly comparable concept to "Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product."
+ The percentages for Nigeria Series B were calculated using "Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost,"
a somewhat similar, but not strictly comparable concept to "Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product."
Source % Calculated from data found In the United Nations. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1966, and I967. ----------------------------------------
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Also, as was the case in Table 2, in Table 3 "Category 
of Development" designations are indicated for the 
various countries falling into Professor El-Kammash's 
categories of economic development.
In Table 3» looking at the ranges of available 
data for "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a 
Percentage of Gross Domestic Product" for the coun­
tries listed, in almost all cases there is an increase 
from the first year to the final year. In the present 
study, the changes between these first and final years 
could have been examined; but a method which provides 
more comprehensive information concerning the changes 
involved is to fit a linear regression line to the 
data for each country, so as to derive the benefits 
of using the trend over the whole series of years 
rather than just the change between the first and 
final years. Also, by using this procedure, changes 
in these fitted linear regression lines, of the form 
Y = a + bX, can easily be examined over a similar 
period of time, thus making the changes comparable.
The data in Table 3 for "Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation as a Percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product" are the bases for the empirical examination 
of Professor Rostow's theory conducted in this chapter. 
Using the data in Table 3, a linear regression line 
was fitted to the available span of percentages for
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each country to see if the fitted linear regression 
line, when examined for a time period totaling 20 
years in length, would amount to a doubling of 
"Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a Per­
centage of Gross Domestic Product."
In a typical case (United Kingdom, Figure 2 ), 
a linear regression line was fitted to a 1? year span 
of data. This linear regression line was then pro­
jected an additional 3 years to see what percentage
ABchange (Figure 2, x 100) could be expected over a 
20 year period. A 17 year span of data was not avail­
able in all cases (e.g., l4-l6 year spans of data 
were fairly common), but in every case a linear 
regression line was fitted to the available data for 
each country and then projected the number of additional 
years necessary to have a period totaling 20 years.
Also, in calculating the linear regression lines for 
each country the first year of available data was 
considered to be "year 1," regardless of the actual 
year in which the data were first available.
In attempting to fit the linear regression 
lines to the data in Table 3 , a minor problem was 
encountered in the form of changeovers from an older 
series to a newer one. This occurred for 10 countries-- 
as indicated by the "Series A" and "Series B" designa­
tions. A discussion of the manner in which the present
FIGURE 2
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, ANNUALLY, 











Source: Data from Table 3
 Extrapolation
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study deals with this problem is contained in the 
Appendix of this chapter.
Another minor problem encountered was the unavail­
ability of data for some specific years. This occurred 
within the spans of data available for three countries; 
Switzerland, Malaysia, and Guatemala. This problem was 
solved by averaging the data of the year immediately 
preceding and the year immediately following the year 
which lacked data. Since there were no sharp fluctua­
tions in the data of these countries, this was deemed a 
reasonable method to use. In Table 3 the process of 
averaging to arrive at the missing data is indicated by 
the use of parenthesis symbols around the 195^ percent­
age data for Switzerland, Malaysia, and Guatemala.
Using the data in Table 3, the following infor­
mation was calculated:
1) the Y-intercept and the slope (a and b 
respectively of the linear equation Y =
a + bX) of the linear regression line fit­
ted to each series of data;
2) the coefficient of correlation of each fit­
ted linear regression line;
3) the mean, or average, value for each series 
of data;
4) the standard error for each series of data;
5) based on the fitted linear regression
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lines, the percentage change in "Gross 
Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a Per­
centage of Gross Domestic Product" for each 
series of data over a time period totaling 
20 years.
Much of this information has been included in Table 4, 
with the remainder included in later tables.
In the first column of Table 4 are numbers indi­
cating the ordinal relationship of the sample countries- 
with larger numbers connoting lower levels of economic 
developments Similarly, in the third column are Profes­
sor El-Kammash's Category of Development designations 
for these countries. The fourth column contains the 
mean values for the available data in each series.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns contain the Y- 
intercept, slope, and standard error, respectively, of 
the linear regression lines fitted to the series of 
data in Table 3» An explanation of why this informa­
tion has not been included in Table 4 for all of the 
countries is contained in the Appendix of the present 
chapter.
It may be observed in Table 4 that in most 
cases the standard errors of the fitted linear regres­
sion lines are relatively small. This indicates that 
these regression lines are reasonably good approxima­
tions of the data.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION VALUES AND RELATIVE PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN GROSS DOMESTIC 
FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC















1 United States V 17.0 16.9 0.006 0.605 0.82 Canada V 22.9 22.0 0.098 1.658 8.93 Switzerland V 23.7 16.7 0.936 1.425 112.34 New Zealand V 22.0 20.6 0.161 1.139 15.75 Sweden V 21.1 18.3 0.311 0.501 34.0
6 Australia V 24.9 24.6 0.028 1.497 2.27 Luxembourg* V —  — —  — — — —  — Over 1008 Belgium V iB.l 13.9 0.496 0.683 71.39 United Kingdom V 15.4 12.4 0.335 0.369 53.8lO Denmark V 18.6 15.5 0.345 1.022 44.4
11 Norway V 28.8 28.0 0.092 1.684 6.512 France V 18.7 15.5 0.357 0.534 45.9^13 Finland V 25.7 25.1 0.068 1.239 5.4l4 West Germany* V —  — —  — — Under lOO
15 Netherlands V 23.1 19.9 0.350 1.227 35.1

















18 Argentina IV 19.2 19.8 -0.063 2.l4l -6.4
19 Puerto Rico IV 20.5 15.8 0.526 0.843 66.620 Italy IV 20.6 19.0 0.181 1.528 19.1
21 Venezuela* III Under 100
22 Chile* III —  — mm Under 100
23 Union of South III 21.8 23.2 -0.181 2.002 -15.6Africa
24 Yugoslavia III 30.9 30.8 0.012 2.868 0.8
25 Costa Rica* III —  — "  — —  — —  —. Under 10026 Peru III 20.5 23.5 -0.393 2.022 -33.6
27 Bolivia III 14.0 14.2 -o.o4o 1.611 -5.6
28 Brazil II 15.0 16.5 -0.174 1.957 -21.029 Mexico II 15.0 14.3 0.091 0.966 12.830 Portugal II 15.9 13.0 0.358 0.638 55.0
31 Ecuador * II —  — — —  " mm « Under lOO32 Thailand* II —  — mm mm M  mm mm mm Over 100

















35 Malaysia I 12.1 6.0 0.722 1.309 242.236 Colombia* I —  — —  — —  — —  — Under 100
37 Turkey I 13.3 11.4 0.208 1.096 36.638 Guatemala I 11.8 10.9 0.111 2.264 20.4
39 Philippines I 9-4 4.7 0.549 1.076 232.14o Honduras I 13.2 13.2 0.006 1.403 0.9
4l Ceylon* I w  — mm ... mm mu mm Under 100
42 El Salvador I 13.1 11.2 0.378 1.100 67.5
43 Pakistan I 14.2 9.9 1.075 1.579 217.544 South Korea I 12.0 7.6 0.588 1.719 155.1
45 Nigeria* I —  — —  — —  — —  — Over 10046 Mauritius I 15.7 13.3 0.258 2.159 38.7
toto
Source : Calculated from data in Table 3»
*Two series of data were available for this country. A discussion of how 
the series were consolidated and the results were obtained is contained in the Appen­
dix of this chapter.
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Results Relating to Take-Off Stage
The data contained in the final column of Table 
4 are those which are most relevant to Professor Ros­
tow's take-off stage. In this column one may observe 
which countries in the sample experienced an increase 
of 100 per cent or more in investment as a percentage 
of product based on the fitted linear regression lines. 
If Professor Rostow's statement concerning the take­
off stage is correct, a "cluster" of countries some­
where near the bottom of the ranking in Table 4 should 
have experienced this increase.
In Table 4, three of the 17 countries in Cate­
gory V of development— Switzerland, Luxembourg, and 
Japan--experienced a 100 per cent increase; while none 
of the three countries in Category IV of development 
and none of the seven countries in Category III of 
development had as much as 100 per cent increase. One 
of the seven countries in Category II of development, 
Thailand, experienced a 100 per cent increase.
Finally, five of the 12 countries in Category 
I of development (one of the categories most likely to 
contain countries in Professor Rostow's take-off stage) 
had a 100 per cent or more increase. These countries 
were Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan, South Korea, and 
Nigeria.
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Analysis Relatine to Take-Off Stage
Table 5 contains only those countries from Table 
4 which had an increase of 100 per cent or more. In 
the next to the last column of Table 5 it may be seen 
that the coefficients of correlation of the linear 
regression lines fitted to the data for these coun­
tries are generally high. Coefficient of correlation 
information has not been provided fof some of the
countries in Table 5 (designated by an asterisk)
8because they had two series of data.
The coefficient of correlation was calculated 
for the linear regression line fitted to the data of 
each country, but this information has only been 
reported for some of the countries (i.e., those not 
having two series of data) which had increases of 100 
per cent or more. This information has not been pro­
vided for the rest of the countries in Table 4, because 
in most cases it proved to be of little value.
Many of the countries in the sample examined 
had data and fitted linear regression lines that, when 
graphed, proved to be horizontal, or very nearly so.
The formula for calculating coefficients of correla­
tion is so comprised that under such circumstances of
gInformation dealing with how the calculations 
for these countries were conducted is contained in the 
Appendix of this chapter.
TABLE 5
COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE HAVING A DOUBLING OF "GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED 
CAPITAL FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 













Total Number of 
Years for Which 
Data Were 
Available
3 Switzerland V 112.3 0.935 13
7 Luxemb our g * V Over 100 — — 15
17 Japan V 129.9 0.921 17
32 Thailand* II Over 100 - l4
35 Malaysia I 242.2 0.931 1539 Philippines I 232.1 0.920 1643 Pakistan* * I 217.5 0.806 744 South Korea I 155.1 0.809 l445 Nigeria* I Over 100 -- l4
Ul
Source: Calculated from data in Table 3.
*A discussion of how the estimates for these countries were determined is 
contained in the Appendix of the present chapter.
of data.
"The information for Pakistan was calculated using only a seven year span
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horizontal, or nearly horizontal, data the formula 
yields low values which indicate "no relationship" 
even though a close relationship may exist. If the 
data and fitted regression lines have sufficient slope, 
the formula yields valid results. In this study, the 
coefficient of correlation information is of greatest 
importance for countries having a doubling of "Gross 
Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a Percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product" over a 20 year period; and, 
for most of these cases, this information has been
included in Table 5*
In the final column of Table 5 are listed 
the number of observations upon which the calcula­
tions arriving at a percentage change over a 20 year 
period are based. The results for Pakistan (designated 
by a double asterisk) have been included in Table 5 
only as a matter of interest, because they are based 
on calculations using only a seven year span of data.
Contained in Table 6 are the number of coun­
tries in the sample which fall into each of the cate­
gories of development. Also contained here is the 
number of countries in these categories having an 
increase of 100 per cent or more, except that Pakistan
was omitted because the calculations for Pakistan
were based on only a seven year span of data. Thus 
in Table 6, four rather than five of the 12 countries
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TABLE 6
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF 
DEVELOPMENT HAVING A DOUBLING OF "GROSS 
DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 






Number of Countries 
in Category Having a 
Doubling of "Gross 
Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation as a Per­








Source : Calculated from data in Table 4,
*Pakistan was excluded from the group of coun­
tries in Category I of development considered as hav­
ing a 100 per cent increase, because its projected 
increase was based on only a seven year span of data.
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in Category I of development were considered as having 
a 100 per cent increase. Even so, Category I, with 
one third of its countries experiencing a 100 per cent 
increase, had a higher proportion of its countries 
experiencing this increase than any of the other cate­
gories. Category V was next, with three of its 17 
countries experiencing a 100 per cent increase, fol­
lowed by Category II, with one of its seven countries 
experiencing a 100 per cent increase. None of the 
countries in Categories III and IV experienced an 
increase as high as 100 per cent.
In terms of the discussion in the earlier 
chapters, it appears that few countries in the world 
today--and, thus, of the countries examined in the 
present study--are in Professor Rostow's lowest (tra­
ditional society) stage of development. Because of 
this, and because of the briefness of the take-off 
stage, this tends to put Professor Rostow's precondi­
tions and take-off stages near the bottom of the rank­
ing of countries examined in the present study--in the 
vicinity of Category I. Also, some of the countries 
in Category I of development are likely to be in Pro­
fessor Rostow's preconditions stage, while others are 
likely to be in the take-off stage.
Based on these considerations, the relatively 
high proportion of countries in Category I experiencing
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a doubling of investment as a percentage of product 
lends support to Professor Rostow's statement that this 
occurs during the take-off stage. Referring to Table 
6, a cluster of countries near the bottom of the rank- 
ing--in the vicinity of Category I— experienced this 
doubling. In fact, nearly twice as high a proportion 
of the Category X countries (one third) experienced a 
100 per cent increase as was the case for the category 
having the next highest proportion (Category V, with 
roughly one sixth). Category I contained approximately 
one fourth of the countries in the sample examined, 
and yet it contained half of the countries experiencing 
a 100 per cent increase.
It should be noted that none of the countries 
in Categories III and IV experienced an increase of 
as much as 100 per cent. This indicates a slowing 
down in the rate of growth of investment as a percent­
age of product as countries advance beyond the take­
off stage.
Another Way of Analyzing this Aspect
Another way of looking at this was to average 
the values for the increases in investment as a percent­
a g e  of product ("Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Forma­
tion as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product") for 
the countries in each of the five categories of
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development. Where a country had two series of data, 
the two values were averaged, and the single value was 
used. This was possible because the necessary informa­
tion had been calculated for each series of data using 
the same procédure as when a country had only one 
series of data.
These average values for each category of 
development are contained in Table 7» where the average 
value was the highest for the countries in Category I 
of development. The average percentage increase for 
Category I was 103.8 per cent. This was double the 
percentage increase in the category having the next 
highest increase--Category V, with a 50.8 per cent 
increase. The next highest increase was 26.4 per cent 
for Category IV, followed by an increase of 13.8 per 
cent for Category II. The smallest increase was 8.7 
per cent for the countries in Category III of develop­
ment .
These results are comparable to those found 
in the previous analysis. In the first analysis, the 
proportion of countries in Category I having a 100 
per cent increase was approximately double that of the 
proportion in Category V; while in the second analy­
sis, the average percentage increase for the countries 
in Category I was approximately double that for the 
countries in Category V. In the first analysis the
1 3 1
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF "GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL 
FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 





Percentage Change of 
Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation as a 
Percentage of Gross Domes­
tic Product over 20 year 







Source; Calculated from data in Table 4.
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most frequent 100 per cent increases, and in the second 
analysis the greatest average percentage increases, 
occurred in Categories V and I--the categories at the 
extreme high and low levels in terms of economic 
development. Also, both analyses indicate a distinc­
tive difference between Categories I and II--in the 
proportion of countries having a 100 per cent increase 
in the first analysis, and in the average percentage 
increase in the second analysis.
Interpretation
A number of critics in their appraisals of 
Professor Rostov's theory, and of his take-off stage 
in particular, have contended that no valid empirical 
evidence has been found indicating that distinguish­
able breaks, or changes, occur over short spans of 
time--in the manner suggested by Professor Rostow-- 
as nations move along the path toward economic devel­
opment. They felt that the changes which nations go 
through occur slowly, or by degree; and apparently
they considered the limited evidence Professor Rostov
9cited in his book and elsevhere to be insufficient.
9Henri Baudet and J. H, van Stuijvenberg, 
"Rostow's Theory on Growth," Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv. Vol. XC, Hft. 1 (I963), pp. 72-73; A. K. 
Cairncross, "The Stages of Economic Growth," Economic 
History Review. Second Series, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (April,
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Professor Kuznets and others, in their empiri­
cal examinations of the long-term, historical evi­
dence on the economic development of a few, presently 
developed. Western nations, found no evidence indi­
cating the occurrence of distinct changes over short 
spans of time. These studies faced the problem, how­
ever, of a scarcity of usable data covering the earli­
est time periods--especially the critical take-off 
stages--of these countries.
The present study found that distinct differ­
ences in the percentage changes of investment as a 
percentage of product over a short span of time were 
observable for groups of nations at various levels of 
economic development in the sample of countries exam­
ined. It found that, for the countries in the sample, 
a relatively larger proportion of the countries in 
Category I of development experienced a high rate of 
increase over a short period of time than of the coun­
tries in the other categories of economic development. 
Also, it found that the average percentage increase in 
investment as a percentage of product for the countries 
in Category I was relatively higher than the averages
1961), p. 454; Everett E, Hagen, On the Theory of 
Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood,
Illinois: Dorsey Press, I967), p. 5I8; and Simon
Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure: Selected
Essays (New York; W, W, Norton & Company, I965), 
p. 232.
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for the other categories, particularly Category II.
At this point, a limiting factor concerning 
these findings should be noted. The 46 countries 
examined in this chapter contain more than one third 
of the world's population; and, to the writer's knowl­
edge, this is the largest sample of countries yet 
examined concerning this aspect of Professor Rostow's 
theory. Also, to the writer's knowledge, this is the 
first study of its type to use United Nations data 
extensively. Notwithstanding the fairly broad sample 
of countries examined in the present study, it should 
be realized that, for the purposes of the present 
study's examination, only a small fraction were in 
Professor Rostow's take-off stage.
The studies of Professor Kuznets, and others, 
although examining just a few countries, endeavored 
to examine each of these countries over long spans 
of time--attempting to include what data they found 
available for the take-off stage in their examinations 
of each of these countries. The current study examines 
only.a brief span of data for each of its sample coun­
tries (which are ranked according to level of economic 
development) and is able to examine only the stages 
that these countries are in during the span of data 
examined.
While it cannot with certainty be determined
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that the countries in Category I of the present study 
are in Professor Rostov's take-off stage, the factors 
discussed in Chapter V indicate a probability that 
some of the Category I countries may fall in Professor 
Rostov's take-off stage. Furthermore, the high pro­
portion of the Category I countries experiencing a 
100 per cent or more increase, relative to the pro­
portions of countries in the other categories experi­
encing this increase, indicates that distinct changes 
over a short span of time do occur as nations proceed 
along the path of economic development— and that dis­
tinguishing characteristics, indeed, may exist for 
the take-off stage. In addition, the high average 
values for the Category 1 countries, as compared with 
the average values for the other countries, support 
this.
About half as high a proportion of the Cate­
gory V countries, as of the Category I countries, 
experienced an increase of 100 per cent in investment 
as a percentage of product. Also, the average increase 
in investment as a percentage of product was about half 
as high for the Category V countries as for the Cate­
gory I countries. In both these respects, the Category 
II, III, and IV countries were much lower. Thus, this 
indicates that a sort of "stagnation" of growth in 
investment as a percentage of product occurs for those
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countries "intermediate" in terms of level of economic 
development. This interesting characteristic was not 
hypothesized, or mentioned, by Professor Rostow.
In Chapter IV of the present study. Professor 
Cairncross and Professor Checkland were cited as won­
dering if societies, once they have taken-off are 
embarked upon a cumulative, automatic c o u r s e . T o  
the extent the present study has found that a signif­
icant slowdown occurs in the rate of increase in invest­
ment as a percentage of product for the countries 
"intermediate" in terms of level of economic develop­
ment (see Table 7 ), it appears that stagnation or 
falling back occurs, in some cases, unless this is 
compensated for by an increasingly rapid application 
of technology to the existing level of investment.
In summary, the present study found that dis­
tinct differences in the percentage changes of invest­
ment as a percentage of product over short spans of time 
occur as nations move along the path of increasing 
economic development. This is illustrated in Table 7, 
which gives the average changes in investment as a 
percentage of product over a 20 year period for each
A. K. Cairncross, "The Stages of Economic 
Growth," Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. 
XIII, No.”3 (April, 1961), pT ; and S. G, Checkland, 
"Theories of Economic and Social Evolution: The Ros­
tow Challenge," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. VII, No. 3 (November, 19éo), p. 1Ô3»
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category of development. In this respect, Category I 
of the present study is differentiated from Category II 
(the next highest category of development).
In addition, a larger proportion of the sample 
countries in Category I than of the other categories 
of development experienced the rapid increase in invest­
ment as a percentage of product which Professor Rostow 
cites as a characteristic of the take-off stage. If 
it could have been clearly determined by other criteria 
that these countries were in his take-off stage this 
would have lent a certain amount of support to his 
theory. Unfortunately, due to Rostow's lack of rigor 
and explicitness in defining the take-off stage it 
was not possible to determine more than a limited 
probability of this being the case--due mainly to the 
position of these countries in relation to the others 
Professor El-Kammash ranked ordinally according to 
level of economic development.
A Second Aspect of Professor Rostow's 
TheorV Examined
Professor Rostow stated that during the drive-
to-maturity stage, "some 10-20% of the national income
11is steadily invested. . . ." The drive-to-maturity
^^Rostow, p. 9.
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stage is the stage immediately following Professor 
Rostov's take-off stage, which was examined in the 
first part of the present chapter. Examined in the 
first part of this chapter was Professor Rostov's 
stàtement that investment increases from 5 per cent 
to 10 per cent of national income during the brief 
take-off stage. Thus, from these two statements, Pro­
fessor Rostov can be interpreted as saying that 
investment becomes a larger percentage of national 
income as nations become more developed.
This portion of the chapter examines the avail­
able evidence to see if the sample countries higher 
along the path of economic development have higher 
percentages of their products devoted to investment.
The hypothesis examined is that the percentages for 
the countries high in the ranking are observably higher 
than those for the countries at the lower end of the 
ranking.
Calculations and Results
As a preliminary step, the mean value of the 
data for each country in Table 3 was plotted in Fig­
ure 3» Where a country had two series of data, the 
mean values were averaged and the single value was 
plotted. Thus, 46 countries ranked according to level 
of economic development were plotted along the horizontal
FIGURE 3
MEAN VALUES OF GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL 
FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 
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Source: Calculated from data in Table 3, for list of countries see Table 3.
L̂arger number indicates a lower level of economic development.
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axis of Figure 3» Country 46, on the left, represents 
Mauritius (the country ranking lowest in terms of level 
of economic development); and country 1, on the right, 
represents the United States (the country ranking 
highest). Thé vertical axis of Figure 3 represents 
the mean value of "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Forma­
tion as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product" for 
each country. In Figure 3, it may be observed that 
this percentage generally becomes larger for more 
highly developed countries. Some of the divergences 
from this trend are likely to be due to the variations 
in accounting practices from country to country.
An average value was calculated for each of the 
five categories of development using the data plotted 
in Figure 3. In other words, the data for the sample 
countries were used, and a single average value was 
used for each country having two series of data.
These average values by category of development are 
contained in Table 8.
In Table 8, the average values calculated for 
each category of development are positively related to 
an increasing level of economic development. In 
every case there are successively higher average 
: values for higher categories of economic development. 
The average value for Category I is 12.7» the value 
for Category II is 14.9» and the value for Category
l4l
TABLE 8
MEAN VALUE OF GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 











Source: Calculated from data in Table 3.
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III is 19»9» The average values for Categories IV 
and V are 20,1 and 22.2, respectively. This informa­
tion has been plotted in Figure 4,
As a further step, the rank correlation was 
computed for the data plotted in Figure 3 using the 
6ld2formula r = — . A value of 0,75 was obtained, 
n(n -l)
lending support to the notion that investment becomes 
a larger percentage of national product as contries 
become more developed.
The above results based on the 46 countries in 
the sample indicate that, in moving from countries 
which are lower to those which are higher in terms of 
level of economic development, investment becomes an 
increasingly large percentage of national product.
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FIGURE 4
MEAN VALUE OF GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED 
CAPITAL FORMATION AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AVERAGE 
FOR 46 COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY OF 










Source: Data from Table 8.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI
When, in the present study, an attempt was 
made to fit linear regression lines to the data in 
Table 3, a minor difficulty was encountered due to 
the changeovers from older series of data to newer 
ones; this occurred for 10 countries. Two cases typi­
cal of these 10 countries are illustrated in Figures 
5 and 6 by means of graphing some of the percentage 
data from Table 3. In Figure 3 i Chile, the situation 
is illustrated where a discontinuity is observable 
between the "Series A" data and the "Series B" data. 
In this case there is a vertical "jump" (a movement 
upward on the Y-axis) from "Series A" to "Series B." 
If a linear regression line were fitted to the per­
centage data for Chile without compensating for this 
jump, the slope of the linear regression line would 
be unduly exaggerated. Similarly, in a case of a 
vertical "drop" from "Series A" to "Series B," and 
no compensation were made, the slope of the fitted 
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In Figure 6 a case is given where the series 
of percentage data appears to be continuous, even 
though there is a changeover from an older series to 
a newer one. The data for West Germany in Figure 6 
are typical of the data for several of the countries 
which had a changeover from one series to another in 
which the data appeared to be continuous.
For those 10 countries in Table 3 which had 
two series of data, an attempt was made by this 
researcher to adjust and consolidate the series before 
reporting the results of various calculations in 
Table 4. This was done so that what data were avail­
able would be utilized, and so that as many countries 
as possible would be included in the sample examined 
in the present study.
As a preliminary step, the same calculations 
were conducted for each series of data for these 10 
countries as had been conducted for the other coun­
tries. This consisted of finding:
1) the Y-intercept and the slope of the linear 
regression line fitted to each series of 
data ;
2) the coefficient of correlation of each fit­
ted linear regression line;
3) the mean, or average, value for each series 
of data ;
FIGURE 6
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN 
WEST GERMANY AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
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4) the standard error for each series of data;
5) based on the fitted linear regression lines, 
the percentage change in "Gross Domestic 
Fixed Capital Formation as a Percentage of 
Gbross Domestic Product" for each series of 
data over a time period totaling 20
years.
Taken individually, a range of often less than 
10 years of data was available for each of these ser­
ies; although, when considered together, a range of 
usually l4 to 1? years was available for a particular 
country.
The author plotted the "Series A" and "Series 
B" data for these countries on a graph, along with the 
regression lines which had been fitted to the "Series 
A" and "Series B" data. The results of the plotted 
data and regression lines for both of a country's 
series were considered by the author in estimating 
whether an increase of 100 per cent over a 20 year 
period appeared reasonable. The results of this pro­
cess of estimation were reported in the final column 
of Table 4 only as increase "Under 100" per cent or 
increase "Over 100" per cent. More specific estimates 
of the magnitudes of these changes for the countries 
having two series of data were not attempted. In 
Table 4 the countries having these estimates are indi­
cated by the use of an asterisk (*).
CHAPTER VII
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF EXPENDITURE ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES
Introduction
In this chapter, Professor Rostov's state­
ment concerning the rapid expansion of the govern­
mental sector in a nation's economy during the take­
off stage is examined. According to Professor Rostov, 
one of the necessary conditions for the take-off stage 
to occur is:
*) the existence or quick emergence of a pol­
itical, social and institutional framevork 
vhich exploits the impulse to expansion in 
the modern sector and the potential external 
economy effects of the take-off and gives 
to grovth an on-going character.1
In this statement Professor Rostov is not as 
specific as he is in the take-off stage requirement
W. W. Rostov, The Stages of Economic Grovth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, i960), p . 39*
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examined in the previous chapter
*) a rise in the rate of productive investment 
from, say, 59̂  or less to over 10% of 
national income (or net national product 
(NNP)).2
It follows from the second statement that a 
doubling of investment as a percentage of product is 
necessary in order for the take-off stage to occur in 
a given country; while it follows from the first state­
ment that in some cases the requisite governmental 
structure may already be in existence, and in other 
cases there is a rapid expansion of the governmental 
sector, the magnitude of which Professor Rostow does 
not specify other than by the words "quick emergence."
The method used here to examine the increase 
in government as a percentage of product is similar 
to that used in the previous chapter to examine the 
increase in investment as a percentage of product. 
Professor Rostow’s statement examined in the previous 
chapter required that a 100 per cent increase of 
investment as a percentage of product during the take­
off period be used as the criterion in seeing whether 
the available data support this statement. Although 
Professor Rostow did not specify the magnitude of the 
increase in the proportionate size of the governmental
^Ibid.
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sector, increases of 50 and 100 per cent have been 
arbitrarily chosen for the present study as a means 
of examining this statement.
Certain limitations concerning the data 
examined in the present chapter exist which were not
encountered in the previous chapter. In spite of the
i
earnest efforts of the United Nations to make data 
for "government consumption expenditure!' comparable 
for different countries, more problems are encountered 
with the data for this concept than was the case with 
the data for "gross domestic fixed capital, formation." 
These limitations and their implications concerning 
the validity of the study being performed in the 
present chapter are discussed in the following section.
Limitations of the Data
The United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics defines "general government consumption 
expenditure" as follows;
Compensation of employees and purchases by general 
government from enterprises and from the rest of 
the world less sales of goods and services (other 
than surplus stores which are treated as a decrease 
in government stocks) to enterprises and households.
The general government sector covers all cen­
tral, state or local government agencies other 
than those defined as public enterprises, irre­
spective of the treatment of those agencies in 
the government accounts of the particular country. 
Social security schemes are included.
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Expenditure jointly financed by households and 
general government is allocated to the sector 
which actually makes the purchase and the contri­
bution of the other sector is treated as a trans­
fer. However, where households pay only a nominal 
amount the general government sector is considered 
as the purchaser and the charge to households 
recorded as a transfer to general government.
Expenditure of a capital nature for national 
defence (excluding civil defence) is treated as 
consumption expenditure while all expenditure on 
capital formation for civil purposes . . .  is 
included in gross domestic fixed capital formation.
Transfers in kind made by general government 
to the rest of the world, other than transfers of 
military equipment, are excluded here and included 
in exports while similar transfers received from 
abroad by general government are included in both 
general government consumption expenditure and 
imports. Transfers of military equipment between 
governments are treated simply as consumption 
expenditure of the donor government and are not _ 
recorded in the accounts of the receiving country.
The data for government expenditure examined 
in this chapter are subject to certain problems not 
encountered with the data for capital formation in the 
last chapter. These problems result from the fact 
that the United Nations data on government expenditure 
for some of the sample countries examined in this 
study are not broken down into components--this is 
especially true of the data for those countries which 
are least developed.
The primary problem is that in those cases
3United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics. 1966 (New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I967), pp. xvi-xvii.
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where the data for government expenditure are not 
broken down it is not possible to know what is hap­
pening to the amount of money being spent in the area 
of military expenditures. The proportionate size of 
government military expenditures vary from country to 
country due to involvement, or threat of involvement, 
in war activities. If military expenditures make up 
a large proportion--say as much as 20 per cent--of a 
country's government sector, a military build-up can 
have an important impact upon the growth of spending 
in the government sector. Therefore, changes in mili­
tary spending in these cases can have a significant 
impact upon changes in the relative size of the gov­
ernment sector in a nation's economy,
A secondary problem is that it is not possi­
ble to know what is happening to the amount of money 
being spent by each of the sample countries for social 
security and other government transfer payments if the 
data for government expenditure are not broken down. 
This is not a serious problem, because an increase in 
the size of a country's social security system, or 
system of transfer payments, may be roughly considered 
as going along with Professor Rostow's statement con­
cerning an increase in the size of a nation's govern­
ment structure. Professor Rostow's statement being 
examined in this chapter deals with the ", , , quick
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emergence of à political; social and institutional 
framework [underlining minej,"^ Thus the emergence 
of a social security system, or system of transfer 
payments, by the government does not necessarily seem 
to fall outside of this statement.
Although data on military expenditures are 
not available for some of the countries in the sample 
examined in the present study, these data are avail­
able for more than half of the countries examined. 
Table 15 in the Appendix of this chapter contains a 
list of the countries examined. In the last column 
of this table is information indicating whether the 
data on Government Consumption Expenditure is broken 
down into sectors for these countries (i.e., as a 
minimum into "Military" and "Civil" sectors). For 
25 of these countries, breakdowns of government 
expenditure data are available. In some of these 
cases, where the data were available, the military 
sector, made up a large proportion of the government 
sector (i.e., as much as 60 to 80 percent); but in 
all of these 2$ cases except one, Portugal, the trend 
of increase in the military sector was roughly the 
same as, or less than, that for the government sector 
over the years examined. In the case of Portugal the
4Rostow, p. 39,
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the trend of increase in military expenditure was 
roughly similar to, or did not greatly exceed, that 
for the respective government sector.
As for the secondary problem, the evidence 
available for those countries having increases of 50 
per cent or more in government as a percentage of 
product indicates that excessive increases in social 
security or transfer payments are not major causes of 
these increases in the government sector.
In summary, the analysis conducted in the 
present chapter is not as straightforward as that con­
tained in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, in spite 
of the limitations on the data being examined in this 
chapter, an analysis was attempted with the view that 
it might provide some insights concerning this aspect 
of Professor Rostow's take-off stage.
Methodology
In the present chapter, "Government Consump­
tion Expenditure as a Percentage of Expenditure on 
Gross Domestic Product" was calculated for as many 
of the 49 countries Professor El-Kammash ranked 
according to level of economic development, and for 
as many individual years for these countries, as had 
satisfactory United Nations data. As was the case in
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Chapter VI, these data were obtained from various 
issues of the United Nations Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics issued since World War II. In 
the case of each country examined, data from a number 
of these yearbooks were used so that the most recent 
data available would be obtained. In most cases, 
issues of the Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 
for 1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1966, and I967 were 
used, because no one of these provided the complete 
range of data needed. Also, in most cases, the data 
for a given country and year were available in several 
of the issues, but the data from the most recent 
Yearbook in which the data could be found were always 
used.
Because of inadequate data, two countries were 
omitted from those contained in Professor El-Kammash's 
ranking. Both countries, Egypt and India, were elimi­
nated from Category I of development, leaving 47 
countries of the original 49 in the ranking. Based 
on United Nations population estimates for 1967, these 
47 countries contain somewhat more than one third of 
the world's population.
KCalculated using data from, United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook. 1967 (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, I968).
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After these percentages were calculated, a 
linear regression line was fitted to the percentages 
for each country and then projected the number of addi­
tional years necessary to total a 20 year period. The 
percentage change in government as a percentage of 
product over the 20 year period for each of these 
countries was then calculated using these linear 
regression lines. As in Chapter VI, gross data were 
used rather than net data because of greater reliabil­
ity and availability.
Calculations
Enough data were available for many of the 
countries selected for examination to permit the cal­
culation of percentages covering a 1? year span of 
time. For the remaining countries, data for lesser 
spans of time were available, but generally enough 
data were available to permit the calculation of per­
centages covering useful lengths of time. Just as 
"Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a Percentage 
of Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product" was calcu­
lated from the various countries and years indicated 
in Table 3 of Chapter VI, "Government Consumption 
Expenditure as a Percentage of Expenditure on Gross 
Domestic Product" was calculated for the various coun­
tries and years indicated in Table 9 of this chapter.
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TABLE 9
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURE ON 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, SELECTED COUNTRIES, I95O-I966
k 0 m
PP
Government Consumption Expenditure as a Percentage of Expenditure 
on Gross Domestic Product
Country 1 1950 1951 195a 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
1 A United States V 12.3 16.4 20.2 19.9 18.8 17.0 17.2 16.0 18,7 16.0 17.9 18.8 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.2 19.22 A Canada V 9.7 12.2 14.5 14.9 l':.8 14.3 13.9 13.7 14.3 13.9 14.3 15.0 14.5 14.2 14.2 13.8 14.3
3 A Switzerland V 11.8 12.3 10.5 10.7 11.2 12.0 11.1 10.2 10.9 11.3 11.7 11.6 11.6 12.04 A New Zealand V 11.1 13.0 12.7 13.4 10.9 12,6 13.2 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.0 13.2 13.3 12.8 12.9 13.5 14.0
5 A Sweden V 13.9 l4.l 15.6 16.9 16,7 16,9 16.9 17.6 17.9 18.0 17.6 17.4 18.4 19.0 18.9 19.5 21.0
6 A Australia V 8.2 10.6 11.1 9.6 9.5 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.7 9.4 9.6 10.2 10.0 9.9 10.3 11.4 11.8
7 A Luxembourg V 13.0 11.8 12.1 13.9 13.6 12.7 11.0 11.0 12.6 11.4 10.3
7 B Luxembourg V 10.1 10.0 11.2 12.6 11.1
8 A Belgium V 10.0 10.5 12.3 12.6 12.3 11.4 11.3 11.2 12.1 12.6 12.6 12.1 12.4 13.2 12.6 13.0 13.4
9 A United Kingdom V 16.3 17.5 19.1 18.1 18.1 16.7 17.0 16.6 16.3 16.5 16.5 16.7 17.1 17.0 16.6 16.8 17.3
10 A Denmark V 10.2 11.3 12.0 12.2 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 13.1 12.8 12.7 13.7 14.4 14.6 14.7 15.5 16.011 A Norway V 10.2 11.7 13.7 12.9 12.7 12.5 13.0 13.8 14.2 14.0 14.1 15.1 15.4 15.5 16.2 16.612 A France V 13.9 14.2 15.6 15.2 13.8 12.4 13.9 14.1 13.3 13.9 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.4 13.313 A Finalnd V 11.6 10.2 11.5 12.2 11.6 11.5 12.3 12.5 12.8 13.2 12.6 12.5 13.4 14.2 14.2 14.6 15.114 A West Germany V 15.3 15.4 15.9 14.4 14.6 13.2 12.7 12.6 13.2 13.4 13.5 " — —
l4 B Vest Germany V 13.6 14.1 15.0 15.7 14.9 15.4 15.8
15 A Netherlands V 13.6 13.3 14.0 14.1 14.6 14.6 15.1 15.1 14.6 13.7 13.7 14.2 14.8 15.7 15.8 15.7 16.116 A Austria V 11.9 13.1 13.4 13.7 13.7 12.4 12.7 13.6 13.7 13.7 12.9 12.7 12.7 13.2 13.5 13.6 13.917 A Japan V 11.1 9.1 11.1 10.8 11.1 10.5 9.7 9.0 9.9 9.2 8.6 8.3 8.7 9.4 9.3 9.6 9.618 A Argentina IV — 12.0 13.3 10.0 14.4 10.1 9.9 8.6 9.8 8.6 9.0 10.2 11.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 11.4


























24 A "Yugoslavia III 22.7 16.9 18.2 15.3 15.0 13.0 13.9 13.0 13.2 13.6 13.3 11.8 10.4 9.1 8.525 A Costa Rica III 7.1 7.5 7.9 7.7 8.4 9.7 10.6 10.2 10.5 11.3 11.7 12.3 12.0 13.2 13.526 A Peru III -- 7.8 8.7 8.8 7.6 9.1 8.7 8.7 8.9 8.4 9.3 9.2 9.6 10.2 10.0 —
27 A Bolivia III 9.2 9.4 8.6 9.2 9.2 9.6 9.5 10.9 10.428 A Spain III 6.8 9.0 9.5 8.1 9.0 8.9 7.5 8.2 8.2 7.829 A Brazil II 10.8 11.0 11.3 15.1 11.5 13.5 14.7 14.4 13.7 13.8 15.3 15.5 15.5 16.3 15.4 13.7 13.830 A Mexico II 4.4 (4.4)• 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.831 A Portugal II — 9.9 9.6 12.1 10.3 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.9 10.6 12.7 13.0 12.5 12.5 12.3 12.3
32 A Ecuador II 13.8 13.5 12.7 13.4 12.8 12.4 12.1 11.7 11.4 11.8
32 B Ecuador II 12.8 13.7 13.4 12.8 13.3 13.6
33 A Thailand II 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.3
33 B Thailand II 9.2 9.3 8.6 10.0 9.0 9.1 8.7 9.0 9.2 9.234 A Burma II 10.2 8.6 9.7 9.5 15.2 11.0 11.7 12.1 13.6 13.5 13.9 13.1 13.4 13.3 15.6 — --
35 A Morocco II 6.5 6.6 7.6 6.1 10.7 11.5 12.7 12.6 12.8 13.4 14.5 13.7 14.4 14.9 13.736 A Malaysia I 6.9 7.5 11.0 13.3(13.2)13.0 13.9 14.4 15.7 14.0 13.0 14.3 14.6 15.7 17.0 17.1
37 A Colombia I 10.2 11.1 11.2 6.7 6.7 7.1 6.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.7 7.0 7.4 6.6 6.738 A Turkey I 14.3 12,4 11.4 14.5 11.6 14.6 13.3 12.0 11.6 12.4 12.7 14.1 14.7 14.3 14.3 14.2 13.139 A Guatemala I 11.3 9.9 12.6 6.6 11.9 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.9 7.8 8.0 7.1 6.9 6.7 7.8 7.5
40 A Philippine# I 7.2 7.3 7.9 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.5 9.8 10.0 10.041 A Honduras I 5.9 6.3 6.6 6.5 6.4 7.6 9.9 9.2 9.9 9.4 9.7. 9.8 9.0 9.2 9.9 9.7 9.942 A Ceylon I 10.7 10.4 12.6 13.1 12.0 11.2 12.442 B Ceylon I 14.6 14.2 14.3 14.6 14.2 13.9 14.3 14.5 13.943 A El Salvador I — — — — — -- — 10.2 10.3 10.1 10.3 10.0 9.4 8.7 8.7 8.7
44 A Pakistan I 8.6 8.2 8.4 8.9 10.3 10.1 12.745 A South Korea I 7.9 11.6 6.8 9.5 10.9 12.7 14.1 14.5 13.6 14.4 11.3 9.0 9.5 10.346 A Nigeria I 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.6 4.9 4.9 5.146 B Nigeria I 6.5 7.6 8^4 8.1 7.447 A Mauritius I 9.5 10.3 11.4 10.3 10.5 10.1 9.9 10.6 12.5 12.4 15.3 12.5 13.0 10.7 13.7 15.4 16.9
{ ) Designate# data calculated by averaging the data for the year immediately preceding and the year immedi­
ately following, a year for which no data were available.
-- Reliable data not available (For this series of data)
* The percentages for Yugoslavia were calculated using "Expenditure on Gross Material Product," a somewhat 
similar, but not strictly comparable concept to "Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product."
Sourest Calculated from data found in the United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics.
1957, 1958, 1959. 1961, 1962, 1966, and 1967. '
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In Table 9 , 4? countries are ordered according 
to level of economic development. For a number of 
these countries there was a changeover from an older 
series of data td a newer series of data and, for this 
study, these were labeled "Series A" and "Series B," 
respectively. Thus, there are 55 entries under the 
column labeled "Country" in Table 9 because of the 
"Series A" and "Series B" designations of the data.
Also, as in Table 3 of Chapter VI, Table 9 of this 
chapter contains "Category of Development" designations 
for various countries falling into Professor El-Kammash's 
categories of economic development.
For the countries listed in Table 9 , the ranges 
of available data for "Government Consumption Expendi­
ture as a Percentage of Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product" in most cases experience an increase from the 
first year to the final year. For example, in the 
case of the United States, the Table 9 percentage for 
the year 1950 is 12.3, and the percentage for the year 
1966 is 19.2--a sizable increase. In contrast, in the 
case of Switzerland, the Tablé 9 percentage for the 
year 1953 is 11.8, while the percentage for the year 
1966 is 12.0--a rather small increase. These two 
cases serve to illustrate that, in Table 9, the change 
from the first year to the final year varies consider­
ably in magnitude from one country to another.
I6l
In this study, the changes between these 
first and final years could have been examined; but, 
as in Chapter VI, a method which provides more com­
prehensive information concerning the changes involved 
is to fit a linear regression line to the data for 
each country, so as to derive the benefits of using 
the trend over the whole series of years rather than 
the mere change between the first and final years.
In addition, by using this procedure, changes in these 
fitted linear regression lines, of the form Y = a + bX, 
can easily be examined over a similar period of time, 
thus making the changes comparable.
The data in Table 9 for "Government Consump­
tion Expenditure as a Percentage of Expenditure on 
Gross Domestic Product" are the basis for the empiri­
cal examination of Professor Rostow*s theory conducted 
in this chapter. Using the data in Table 9 , a linear 
regression line was fitted to the available span of 
percentages for each country to see if the fitted 
linear regression line, when examined for a time 
period totaling 20 years in length, would amount to 
50 and 100 percent increases in "Government Consump­
tion Expenditure as a Percentage of Expenditure on 
Gross Domestic Product,"
In a typical case, a linear regression line 
was fitted to a 17 year span of data, and projected
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an additional three years to see what percentage 
change could be expected over a 20 year period. A 
17 year span of data was not available in all cases 
(e.g., l4-l6 year spans of data were common), but in 
every case a linear regression line was fitted to the 
available data for each country and then projected the 
number of additional years necessary to have a period 
totaling 20 years. Also, in calculating the linear 
regression lines for each country the first year of 
available data was considered to be "year 1," regard­
less of the actual year in which the data were first 
available.
In attempting to fit the linear regression 
lines to the data in Table 9, a minor problem was 
encountered in the form of changeovers from an older 
series to a newer one. This occurred for 7 countries-- 
as indicated by the "Series A" and "Series B" designa­
tions in Table 9« The study conducted in this chapter 
dealt with this problem in the same manner as in the 
previous chapter. A discussion of how this problem was 
handled is contained in the Appendix of Chapter VI.
The problem of data unavailability for a given 
year within a series was resolved for two countries in 
Table 9 by averaging the data of the year preceding 
and following the year for which the data could not 
be found. This was deemed a reasonable method to use
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since there were no sharp fluctuations in the data for 
these countries. This process of averaging to arrive
at the missing data is indicated in Table 9 by the
use of parentheses around the 1954 percentage data for 
Mexico and Malaysia.
Using the data in Table 9, the following 
information was calculated;
1) the Y-intercept and the slope (a and b 
respectively of the linear equation Y =
a + bX) of the linear regression line fit­
ted to each series of data;
2) the coefficient of correlation of each 
fitted linear regression line;
3) the mean, or average, value for each ser­
ies of data;
4) the standard error for each series of data;
5 ) based on the fitted linear regression lines, 
the percentage change in "Government Con­
sumption Expenditure as a Percentage of 
Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product" for 
each series of data over a time period 
totaling 20 years.
Much of this information has been included in Table 10, 
and most of the rest is included in later tables.
TABLE 10
REGRESSION VALUES AND RELATIVE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT















I United States V 18.1 16. 7 0.147 1.560 17-52 Canada V 13.9 12.9 0.109 1.092 16.93 Switzerland V 11.3 11.2 0.018 0.591 3.24 New Zealand V 12.9 12.1 0.088 0.618 14.6
5 Sweden V 17.4 14.5 0.331 0.633 45.8
6 Australia V 10.0 9.2 0.085 0.720 18.3
7 Luxembour g * V —  — —  — —  — —  — Under 508 Belgium V 12.1 10.9 0.137 0.599 25.39 United Kingdom V 17-1 17.6 -0.055 0.681 -6.310 Denmark V 13.2 10.8 0.274 0.495 51.0
11 Norway V 13.8 11.0 0.331 0.586 60.012 France V 13.8 14.5 -0.076 0.614 -10.513 Finland V 12. 7 10.6 0.233 0.497 43.8l4 West Germany* V —  — —  — —  — Under 50
15 Netherlands V 14.6 13.5 0.125 0.560 18.5















18 Argentina IV 10.6 11.5 -0.107 1.446 -18.6
19 Puerto Rico IV 13.4 12.7 0.078 0.478 12.320 Italy IV 12.6 10.7 0.211 0.684 39.5
21 Venezuela* III mm — Under 5022 Chile* III —  — —  — —  — —  — Under 50
23 Union of
South Africa III 10.6 9.6 0.123 0.691 25.624 Yugoslavia III 14.0 20.2 -0.771 1.392 -76.5
25 Costa Rica III 10.2 6.5 0.467 0.362 143.826 Peru III 8.9 7.9 0.l40 0.420 35.6
27 Bolivia III 9.6 8.6 0.192 0.427 44.628 Spain III 8.5 9.3 -0.139 0.445 -30.1
29 Brazil II 13.8 11.7 0.236 1.225 40.230 Mexico II 4.9 4.0 0.127 0.172 63.4
31 Portugal II 11.2 9.5 0.215 0.860 45.532 Ecuador* II —  — —  — mm — mm mm Under 50
33 Thailand* 11 •—  — —  — •— mm — Under 5034 Burma II 12.3 9.4 0.364 1.305 77.6



















36 Malaysia I 13.4 9.0 0.514 1.471 113.537 Colombia I 7.3 9.3 -0.230 1.389 -49.438 Turkey 1 13.3 12.6 0.072 1.098 11.5
39 Guatemala I 8.2 10.1 -0.220 1.664 -43.3
ko Philippines I 8.6 7.0 0.184 0.167 52.5
41 Honduras I 8.6 6.5 0.240 0.791 74.042 Ceylon* I —  — —  — —  — —  “ Under 5O
43 El Salvador I 9.6 10.8 -0.242 0.282 -44.744 Pakistan I 9.6 7.0 0.643 0.724 182.945 South Korea 1 11.3 10.6 0.090 2.140 16.9
46 Nigeria * I Over 1004? Mauritius I 12.1 9.0 0.344 1.303 76.9
CT\
0 \
Source: Calculated from data in Table 9-
*Two series of data were available for this country. These series were 
consolidated in the manner discussed in the Appendix to Chapter VI.
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In the first column of Table 10 are numbers 
indicating the ordinal relationship of the sample coun- 
tries--with larger numbers signifying lower levels of 
economic development. In the same manner, the third 
column contains Professor El-Kammash's Category of 
Development designations for countries of approximately 
similar levels of economic development. The fourth 
column contains the mean values for the available data 
in each series. The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns 
contain the Y-intercept, slope, and standard error, 
respectively, of the linear regression lines fitted 
to the series of data in Table 9. As was the case in 
Table 4 of the previous chapter, this information has 
not been provided in Table 10 for those countries 
having two series of data because of the procedure of 
estimation used in combining the two series.
One may observe in Table 10 that the standard 
errors of the fitted linear regression lines are rela­
tively small in most of the cases. From this it may 
be inferred that these regression lines are reasonably 
good approximations of the data.
Results
The data contained in the final column of 
Table 10 are those which are most relevant to Professor 
Rostov’s statement concerning the take-off stage. In
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this column one is able to observe which of the coun­
tries in the sample experienced a large increase over 
the 20 year period. If Professor Rostov's statement 
concerning the take-off stage is correct, a "cluster" 
of countries somewhere near the bottom of the ranking 
in Table 10 should have experienced large increases-- 
say, in the magnitude of 50 to 100 per cent in govern­
ment as a percentage of product based on the fitted 
linear regression lines. Although an increase of 100 
per cent was used to examine the statement in the last 
chapter, an increase in the magnitude of 50 to 100 
per cent will be used to examine the statement in 
the present chapter. This is because the statement 
in the present chapter allows for the previous exis­
tence, as well as the rapid expansion, of the govern­
ment sector as a major part of a nation's national 
product.
In Table 10, none of the 17 countries in Cate­
gory V of development and none of the three countries 
in Category IV of development had as much as a 100 
per cent increase. One of the eight countries in Cate­
gory III of development, Costa Rica, experienced a 
100 per cent increase; and one of the seven countries 
in Category II of development, Morocco, experienced 
a 100 per cent increase. Category I of development 
contained the largest number of countries having an
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increase of 100 per cent or more. Three of the Cate­
gory I countries--Malaysia, Pakistan, arid Nigeria—  
had a 100 per cent or more increase.
Table 11 contains the countries from Table 10 
■which had an increase of 100 per cent or more. In 
the next to the last column of Table 11 it can be seen 
that the coefficients of correlation for the linear 
regression lines fitted to the data for these countries 
are generally high. Coefficient of correlation infor­
mation has not been provided for Nigeria because it 
had two series of data.^
As in Chapter VI, coefficient of correlation 
information has only been provided for those countries 
in the present chapter having relatively high increases 
(above 50 per cent), because the formula for calculating 
the coefficient of correlation yields unusable results 
when the fitted linear regression lines are horizontal, 
or nearly so.
In the final column of Table 11 are listed the 
number of observations upon which the calculations
^Information dealing with how the calculations 
for Nigeria were conducted is contained in the Appendix 
to Chapter VI.
TABLE 11
COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE HAVING A ICO PER CENT INCREASE IN "GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURE ON 















25 Costa Rica III 143.8 0.984 15
35 Morocco II 181.5 0.928 15
36 Malaysia I 113.5 0.849 1544 Pakistan* I 182.9 0.871 746 Nigeria* * I Over 100 —  — 12
H
O
Source; Calculated from data in Table 9»
*The information for Pakistan was calculated using only a seven year span
of data.
* *A discussion of how the estimate for Nigeria was determined is contained 
in the Appendix to Chapter VI.
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arriving at a percentage change over a 20 year period 
are based. The results for Pakistan have only been 
included in Table 11 as a matter of interest, because 
they are based on calculations using only a seven 
year span of data.
Looking at the final column of Table 10, two 
of the 17 countries in Category V of development had 
a 50 per cent or more increase. These are Denmark and 
Norway. None of the three countries in Category IV of 
development had an increase of as much as 50 per cent; 
while one of the eight countries in Category III of 
development, Costa Rica, had an increase of over 100 
per cent. Three of the seven countries in Category 
II of development--Mexico, Burma, and Morocco-- 
experienced increases of 50 per cent or more. Cate­
gory I of development contained the largest number 
of countries having increases of 50 per cent or more. 
Six of its 12 countries had an increase of at least 
50 per cent. These are Malaysia, Philippines, Hon­
duras, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Mauritius.
Table 12 contains the countries from Table 10 
that had increases of 50 per cent or more. In the 
next to the last column of Table 12 it can be seen 
that the coefficients of correlation for the linear 
regression lines fitted to the data for these countries 
are generally high. As in Table 11, coefficient of
TABLE 12
COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE HAVING A 50 PER CENT OR MORE INCREASE IN 
"GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 




Per Cent Change 









10 Denmark V 51.0 0.938 1711 Norway V 60.0 0.933 16
25 Costa Rica III 143.8 0.984 15
30 Mexico II 63.4 0.948 1334 Burma II 77-6 0.769 15
35 Morocco II 181.5 0.928 15
36 Malaysia I 113.5 0.849 1540 Philippines I 52.5 0.981 164l Honduras I 74.0 0.829 1744 Pakistan* I 182.9 0.871 746 Nigeria * * I Over 100 —  — 12
47 Mauritius I 76.9 0.791 17
■N]
Source: Calculated from data in Table 9»
*The information for Pakistan was calculated using only a seven year span
of data.
* *A discussion of how the estimate for Nigeria was determined is contained 
in the Appendix to Chapter VI.
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correlation information has not been provided for
7Nigeria because it had two series of data.
In the final column of Table 12 are listed 
the number of observations upon which the calculations 
arriving at a percentage change over a 20 year period 
are based. As in Table 11, results for Pakistan have 
been included in Table 12, but it is important to 
note that they are based on calculations using only 
a seven year span of data.
Analysis
Listed in Table 13 are the number of sample 
countries examined in this chapter which fall into 
each of the categories of development. Also contained 
there is the number of countries in each of these cate­
gories having an increase of 100 per cent or more, and 
the number having an increase of 50 per cent or more.
In the first two columns of Table 13 it may be 
seen that 17 of the 4? sample countries fall into 
Category V of development. From the next column it 
may be seen that none of these 17 countries in Category 
V had an increase of 100 per cent or over. One may 
observe from the last column of Table 13 that two of 
the countries in Category V had an increase of 50
?lbid.
TABLE 13
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DEVELOPMENT HAVING 
50 AND 100 PER CENT OR MORE INCREASES IN "GOVERNMENT 
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 




Number of Countries in Category
Total
Having Increase of at Least
100 Per Cent 50 Per Cent
V 17 0 2
IV 3 0 0
III 8 1 1
II 7 1 3
I 12 2* 5*
Total 47 4 11
H
-vl
Source : Calculated from data in Table 10,
*Pakistan was excluded from the groups of countries in Category I of devel­
opment considered as having 50 and 100 per cent increases, because its projected 
increase was based on only a seven year span of data.
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per cent or more.
None of the three countries in Category IV 
had an increase of as much as 50 per cent, whilë one 
of the eight countries in Category III had an increase 
of 100 per cent or more. One of the seven countries 
in Category II had an increase of 100 per cent or more, 
while three of these seven countries had increases of 
50 per cent or more.
Pakistan was omitted from the countries in 
Category I of development considered as having a 100 
per cent increase, because the calculations for Pakistan 
were based on only a seven year span of data. Thus, 
in Table 13, two rather than three of the 12 countries 
in Category I were considered as having a 100 per cent 
increase— and five rather than six of the countries in 
Category I were considered as having at least a 50 per 
cent increase. Even so, Category I had a larger number 
of countries experiencing these 50 and 100 per cent 
increases than did any of the other categories.
So few countries had increases of 100 per cent 
or more (only 4) that little information is provided 
by this. Eleven ^f the 4? sample countries had increases 
of 50 per cent or more, and this projection seems to be 
more informative. Categories I and II contain the 
largest proportions of countries experiencing increases 
of 50 per cent or more--with five of the 12 Category I
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countries and three of the seven Category II countries 
having increases of this magnitude. Category III 
contains the next largest proportion of countries 
experiencing increases of 50 per cent or more--with 
one of its eight countries having this increase. Next 
is Category V with two of its 17 countries having an 
increase of 50 per cent or more over the 20 year per­
iod. Last is Category IV, in which hone of the three 
countries has an increase of as much as 50 per cent.
Another Way of Analyzing This Aspect
Another way of examining this aspect of Pro­
fessor Rostow's theory is to average the values for 
the increases in government as a percentage of product 
("Government Consumption Expenditure as a Percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product") for the countries in each 
of the five categories of development. These calcula­
tions were conducted for this study, and, where a coun­
try had two series of data, the two values were first 
averaged and then the single value was used.
These average values for each category of 
development are contained in Table l4. The average 
value of increase was the highest (56.2 per cent) for 
Category II of development, followed by an average 
value of 43.0 per cent for Category I. Next came 
Category IV with an average value of 33.2 per cent.
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TABLE Ik
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF "GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT" OVER 20 YEAR 
PERIOD, AVERAGE BY CATEGORY 
OF DEVELOPMENT
_ _ Percentage Change in Government Consump-a egory o tion Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross 






Source ; Calculated from data in Table 10.
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followed by Category V with an average value of 19«0 
per cent, and then Category III with an average value 
of 18.2 per cent.
Interpretation
It appears that few countries in the world 
today--and of the countries examined in the present 
study--are in Professor Rostow's lowest (traditional 
society) stage of development. Because of this, and 
because of the briefness of the take-off stagej this 
tends to put Professor Rostow's preconditions and take­
off stages near the bottom of the ranking of countries 
examined in the present study.
Thus, the relatively high proportions of coun­
tries in Categories I and II experiencing increases 
of 50 (and 100) per cent or more over a 20 year period 
of time are noteworthy. Referring to Table 13, rela­
tively high proportions of the Category I and Category 
II countries in the sample examined seem to have 
experienced the "quick emergence" of an enlarged 
governmental structure as compared to the other cate­
gories of development. Further, this is supported by 
the relatively high average percentage increases found 
in Table l4 for the countries in Categories I and II 
of development as compared to the averages for the 
countries in the other categories of development.
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One of the primary limitations of this evidence 
is that data for Government Consumption Expenditure, 
•which are broken down into components (i.e., "Civil" 
and "Military" sectors) are available for only one 
third of the sample countries that experienced increases 
of 50 per cent or more over the 20 year period.
Although the data which are broken down for these 
countries indicate that such things as increases in 
military expenditures are not responsible for these 
rapid increases in the proportionate size of the govern­
ment sector, this does not fully compensate for the 
fact that these data are not available for the remainder 
of the countries experiencing increases of this magni­
tude .
Another qualification to the analysis stems 
from the brief span of data examined for each of the 
47 sample countries. It has been possible to examine 
only the stages that these countries were in during 
the span of data examined. Thus, of the 4? countries 
examined in this chapter, only a fraction of them were 
experiencing Professor Rostow's take-off stage during 
the span of years covered by the data.
A number of critics have contended that no 
valid empirical evidence has been found indicating 
that distinguishable breaks, or changes, occur over 
short spans of time— in the manner suggested by
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Professor Rostow~-as nations move along the path
toward economic development. They believe that the
8changes which nations go through occur gradually. 
Professor Kuznets and others made their empirical 
examinations of the long-term, historical evidence 
on the economic development of a few, presently 
developed. Western nations. They found no evidence 
indicating the occurrence of distinct changes over 
short spans of time.
The present study has found that distinct 
differences in the percentage changes of government 
as a percentage of product over a short span of time 
are observable for groups of nations at various levels 
of economic development in the sample countries exam­
ined. Certain "limitations" were encountered with 
the data examined in this chapter (this was discussed 
in detail in the second section of the chapter). Also, 
there is no reason to believe that the categories of 
development examined in this study necessarily coin­
cide with Professor Rostow's stages of development
gHenri Baudet and J. H. van Stuijvenberg, "Ros- 
tow's Theory on Growth," Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
Vol. XC, Hft. 1 (1963), pp. 72-73» A. K. Cairncross,
"The Stages of Economic Growth," Economic History 
Review. Second Series, Vol. XIII, No. 3 ( April,. I96I ), 
p. 454; Everett E, Hagen, On the Theory of Social 
Change; How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood. Illinois : 
Dorsey Press, I96.7 ) , p. $18; and Simon Kuznets, Economic 
Growth and Structure: Selected Essays (New York: W,
W, Norton & Company, I965), p. 232.
I8l
because the definitions for these catégories and stages 
are based on different criteria.
Keeping these limitations in mind, relatively 
larger proportions of the countries in Categories I 
and II of development (the categories containing the 
least developed countries) experienced a high rate of 
increase in government as a percentage of product over 
a short period of time than did the countries in the 
other categories of economic development. It also 
found that the average percentage increases in govern­
ment as a percentage of product were relatively higher 
for Categories I and II of development than they were 
for the other categories of development.
Summary
It could not be determined in all cases whether 
increases in military expenditures had a large part of 
the responsibility for increases in government expendi­
tures. This considerably weakens the present analysis. 
The analysis of the available data indicated that 
observable differences in the percentage changes in 
government as a percentage of product over short 
spans of time occur as nations move along the path 
of increasing economic development. In these terms, 
Categories I and II (taken as a unit) are dif­
ferentiated from Category III (the next highest
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category of development).
The evidence indicated that a rapid expansion 
of the government sector occurred for the sample coun­
tries in Categories I and II of development. The 
results in the previous chapter were that a rapid 
increase in investment as a percentage of product 
occurred primarily during Category I of development. 
Although Professor Rostow attributes both of these 
characteristics to his take-off stage, this implies 
that the rapid expansion of the government sector 
continues somewhat longer than the rapid increase in 
investment.
As in Chapter VI the cluster of sample coun­
tries at the lower end of Professor El-Kammash's rank­
ing experiencing a rapid increase in government as a 
percentage of product would appear to lend support to 
Professor Rostow's statement if it could be determined 
that these countries were in his take-off stage. 
Unfortunately, as was the case in Chapter VI, it was 
not possible to determine on the basis of Rostow's 
other take-off stage criteria more than a limited 
probability that this was so.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VTI
Table 15 lists the sample countries examined 
in this chapter, and it ranks them according to dimin­
ishing level of economic development, with the countries 
grouped into categories according to level of economic 
development. Indicated in the last column is whether 
the data on Government Consumption Expenditure for 
each of these countries were broken down in the vari­
ous issues of the United Nations Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics. For 25 of these 47 countries, 
breakdowns in government expenditure data were avail­
able at least to the extent of providing data on the 
"Military" and the '^Civil" sectors.
In Table I6 is similar information for the 
countries experiencing increases of $0 per cent or more 
in government as a percentage of product over the 20 
year period. Breakdowns in government expenditure 
data were available for four of the 12 countries con­
tained in Table I6.
It appears that countries higher along the 
path of economic development have higher percentages 










Data for Government 
Consumption Expen­
diture Broken Down 
into Sectors
1 United States V Yes
2 Canada V Yes
3 Switzerland V Yes
4 New Zealand V Yes
5 Sweden V Yes
6 Australia V Yes
7 ■ Luxembourg V Yes8 Belgium V Yes
9 United Kingdom V Yes10 Denmark V Yes
11 Norway V Yes
12 France V Yes
13 Finland V Yes
14 West Germany V Yes
15 Netherlands V Yes
16 Austria V Yes
17 Japan V No
18 Argent ina IV No
19 Puerto Rico IV No
20 Italy IV Yes
21 Venezuela III No
22 Chile III No
23 Union of
South Africa III No
24 Yugoslavia III Yes
25 Costa Rica III No
26 Peru III No
27 Bolivia III Yes28 Spain III No







Data for Government 
Consumption Expen­
diture Broken Down 
into Sectors
31 Portugal II Yes
32 Ecuador II No
33 Thailand II No
34 Burma II No
35 Morocco II No
36 Malaysia I Yes
37 Colombia I No38 Turkey I No
39 Guatemala I No
40 Philippines I No
4l Honduras I Yes
42 Ceylon I No
43 El Salvador I No
44 Pakistan I No
45 South Korea I Yes
46 Nigeria I Yes
47 Mauritius I Yes
Source : Obtained by examining data contained in
United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 
1957, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1966, and 196?.
TABLE 16







Per Cent Increase of Gov­
ernment Consumption Ex­
penditure as a Percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product
Data for Government 
Consumption Expendi­
ture Broken Down 
into Sectors
10 Denmark V 51.0 Yes
11 Norway V 60.0 Yes
25 Costa Rica III 143.8 No
30 Mexico II 63.4 No
34 Burma XI 77-6 No
35 Morocco II 181.5 No
36 Malaysia I 113.5 Yes40 Philippines I 52.5 No4i Honduras I 74.0 No
44 Pakistan I 182.9 No46 Nigeria * I Over 100 Yes
47 Mauritius I 76.9 No
H
00-u
Source : Calculated from data contained in United Nations, Yearbook of
National Accounts Statistics, 1957» 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, I966, and 196?.
*A discussion of how the estimate,for Nigeria was determined is con­
tained in the Appendix to Chapter VI.
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The mean value of the data for each country in Table 9 
has been calculated by computer. Where a country had 
two series of data, these were averaged to arrive at 
a single value. An average value was calculated for 
each of the five categories of development using this 
data. The resulting figures are listed in Table 17 
and plotted in Figure 7-
These average values for each category of 
development are positively related to an increasing 
level of economic development. Generally, there are 
higher values for the categories higher in terms of 
level of economic development. The average value 
for Category I is 10.1, the value for Category II is 
11.0, and the value for Category III is 10.6. The 
average value for Category IV is 12.2, and the aver­
age value for Category V is 13.5*
These results for the 47 countries examined 
indicate that, in moving from countries which are 
lower to those which are higher in terms of level of 
economic development, government expenditure becomes 
an increasingly large percentage of national product.
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TABLE 17
MEAN VALUE OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 













MEAN VALUE OF GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AVERAGE FOR 47  
COUNTRIES, BY CATEGORY OF DEVELOPMENT, 







Source: Dote from Table 17.
CHAPTER VIII
PROPORTION OF URBAN TO TOTAL POPULATION, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES
Introduction
In this chapter Professor Rostov’s statement 
concerning the changing proportions of urban to total 
population is examined. This line of approach vas 
suggested in the vritings of Professor Simon Kuznets 
of Harvard University.^
In discussing the advancement of nations into 
the "Age of High Mass-Consumption," Professor Rostov 
states;
As societies achieved maturity . . .  the 
structure of the vorking force changed in vays 
vhich increased , the proportion of urbah
to total population.
^Simon Kuznets, Economic Grovth and Structure 
Selected Essays (Nev York: W. V, Norton & Company,
1965), p. 213.
2W, W. Rostov, The Stages of Economic Grovth: 
A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, i960), p. 10.
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From the above statement it follows that Ros- 
tow is suggesting that as nations become more devel­
oped the proportion of their populations which is 
rural decreases. Although it is generally accepted 
in the field of economic development that as coun­
tries become more developed their populations become 
more urban, it was decided to examine this statement 
by Professor Rostow since a sample of countries had 
already been selected for the present study which 
were ranked according to level of economic develop­
ment. Also, since the countries in this sample had 
been ranked on the basis of four variables, none of 
which was percentage of urban to total population, 
an examination of this aspect was felt to serve 
as a useful cross-check on the ranking of countries 
which had been used for the analyses in the previous 
chapters.
Factors Affecting the Present Analysis
Although the United Nations has made great 
strides in improving the uniformity of the data it 
publishes, major differences still exist in its popu­
lation data. Not only does the reliability of the 
population data decrease as one goes from the more 
developed to the less developed countries, but also 
significant differences exist from nation to nation
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in the definition of ’’urban" and ’’rural." Thus the 
population data published by the United Nations vary 
accordingly, because of national differences in data 
submitted to it for publication.
It "was considered beyond the scope of this 
study to attempt adjustments in the data beyond those 
made by the United Nations. In addition, Profedsor 
El-Kammash’s 49 sample countries are ranked "ordi- 
nally" in terms of level of economic development, 
and any such adjustments would do little to improve 
the present analysis. Therefore, the data for this 
chapter were obtained, without any further modifi­
cation, from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 
1967. In order that the reader may have some basis 
for judgment, abbreviated national definitions of 
"urban" for the countries examined in this chapter 
are contained in its Appendix.
Procedure and Results
Data for total population and for rural pop­
ulation were obtained from Table 5, pp. 132-205 of 
the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1967; these
3United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 196? 
(New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations,
1968).
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data were for the "latest available year, 1955-1967»"^ 
Using this information, rural population as a percent­
age of total population was calculated for as many of 
Professor El-Kammash's 49 countries as had satisfac­
tory data.
These percentages are presented in Table l8 
and plotted in Figure 8. Either rural or urban pop­
ulation could have been used in conjunction with 
total population to calculate the percentages as long
as consistency were used; the trends would have been 
just the reverse of each other. Rural population as 
a percentage of total population was arbitrarily 
chosen for calculations performed in this study. The 
population data for some of the countries examined 
were broken down into three classifications: urban,
semi-urban, and rural. For the calculations con­
ducted, semi-urban was lumped together with urban 
rather than with rural.
From Table l8 and Figure 8 one may see that, 
generally, the more developed sample countries have, a 
smaller proportion of rural to total population, while 
the less developed sample countries have a higher pro­




RURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 










as a Percentage 
of Total 
Population
1 V United States 30.1
2 V Canada 30.4
3 V Switzerland 48.74 V New Zealand 36.1
5 V Sweden 22.6
6 V Australia 17.8
7 V Luxembourg 37.88 V Belgium - -
9 V United Kingdom 21.110 V Denmark 54.3
11 V Norway 42.8
12 V France 37.0
13 V Finland 57.214 V West Germany —  —
15 V Netherlands 21.6
16 V Austria 50.0
17 V Japan 31.918 IV Argentina —  —
19 IV Puerto Rico 55-9
20 IV Italy —  —
21 111 Venezuela 32.6
22 111 Chile 31.8
23 111 Union of South Africa 53-324 111 Yugoslavia 71.6
25 111 Costa Rica 65.5
26 111 Peru 52.6
27 111 Bolivia —  —
28 111 Spain —  —











as a Percentage 
of Total 
Population
31 II Portugal 77.332 II Ecuador 64.2
33 II Thailand —  —34 II Burma —  —
35 II Morocco 70.7
36 I Malaysia 85.0
37 I Columbia 48.0
38 I Turkey 73.7
39 I Guatemala 66.0
4o I Philippines -----
4l I Honduras 76.8
42 I U.A.R, (Egypt) 62.0
43 I Ceylon 81.2
44 I El Salvador 61.5
45 I Pakistan 86.4
46 I India 82.0
4? I Korea (South) 72.0
48 I Nigeria 83.9
49 I Mauritius
Source; Calculated from data contained in 
Table 5» pp. 132-205, of United Nations, Demographic 
Yearbook. 196? (New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I968). (These data are for the "latest 
available year, 1955-1967.")
--Data not broken down into "Urban" and "Rural" 
for this country.
FIGURE 8
RURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
POPULATION, LATEST AVAILABLE YEAR, 1955 -  1967
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-vj
Country Number
Source: Data from Table IB; for list of countries, see Table 18.
* Larger number indicates a lower level of economic development.
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As a further step, averages were calculated 
for each of Professor El-Kammash's categories of 
economic development. The results of these calcula­
tions are contained in Table 19 and plotted in Figure 
9. It may be observed from these that the average 
values of rural as a percentage of total population 
generally increase as one proceeds from the categories 
containing the more developed nations (e.g., Category 
V) to those containing the less developed nations (e.g., 
Category I). The single exception to this trend is 
the value of 55»9 per cent for Category II of develop­
ment. Although three of Professor El-Kammash's 49 
countries are in this category of development, data 
were available for only one of these countries, and 
this may explain the deviation from the general trend.
Interpretation
The 49 countries ranked according to level of 
economic development by Professor El-Kammash, and used 
as sample countries for the analyses conducted in 
Chapters VI and VII of this study, are in an ordinal 
relationship with each other in terras of level of 
economic development. In addition, the definitions 
of what constitutes "urban" and "rural" population 
vary from country to country; and certain factors such 
as economic specialization, geography, climate, and
J ‘)9
TABLE 19
RURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
POPULATION, AVERAGE FOR 49 COUNTRIES BY 





Percentage of Population 












RURAL POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL POPULATION, AVERAGE FOR 49 COUNTRIES 
BY CATEGORY OF DEVELOPMENT, LATEST 








Category of Development 
Source: Data from Table 19.
developed
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sociological factors (i.e., that rural occupations 
are felt to be "healthy" and "morally desirable" for 
a country to encourage) may affect the balance of 
rural to urban population.
In spite of these factors, it may be inferred 
from Tables l8 and 19 and Figures 8 and 9 that a posi­
tive correlation exists between the ranking of sample 
countries examined in this study and the percentage of 
their total population "urban." Conversely, there is 
a strong inverse relationship apparent between the 
economic level of these countries and the percentage 
of their total population "rural."
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII
Definitions of "urban" vary greatly fz*om coun­
try to country. Although the United Nations goes to 
great ends to make its data as uniform as possible, 
major national differences in these definitions exist. 
The following are abbreviated definitions of "urban" 
for most of the countries examined in the present 
study;
UNITED STATES, All incorporated and unincorporated 
places of 2,500 inhabitants or more, and the towns, 
townships, and counties classified as urban. Towns 
in the New England states, townships in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, and counties in any state which 
did not include a dependent incorporated municipal­
ity and had either a population of 25,000 or more 
or a population of 2,500 to 25,000 and a density 
of 1,500 persons or more per square mile are classi­
fied as urban.
CANADA. Cities, towns and villages of 1,000 or 
more inhabitants, whether incorporated, including 
urbanized fringes of cities classed as metropoli­
tan areas and other major urban areas. In I96I, 
also including urbanized fringes of certain smaller 
cities if the population of city and its urban 
fringe was 10,000 or more.
SWITZERLAND. Communes of 10,000 or more inhabi­
tants including suburbs.
NEW ZEALAND. 1956: Central cities, adjacent
boroughs and the urbanized parts of countries 




SWEDEN. Built-up areas with at least 200 inhabi­
tants and usually not more than 200 metres between 
houses.
AUSTRALIA. Cities and towns of 1,000 or more 
inhabitants and contiguous urban developments.
LUXEMBOURG. Communes having more than 2,000 
inhabitants in the administrative centre (1947).
UNITED KINGDOM:
England and Wales. Area classified as urban 
for local government purposes, i.e., county bor­
oughs, municipal boroughs and urban districts.
Northern Ireland. Administrative county 
boroughs, municipal boroughs, and urban districts. 
Scotland. Cities and all boroughs.
DENMARK, Agglomerations of 200 or more inhabitants,
NORWAY. Urban: Localities or population clusters
of 2,000 or more inhabitants, irrespective of 
administrative divisions, with usually not more 
than 50 metres between houses, but including 
smaller groups of houses naturally belonging to 
a cluster even if they are more than 50 metres 
distant. Semi-urban: Localities or population
clusters of 200-1,999 inhabitants, with distances 
between houses as specified above.
FRANCE. Communes containing an agglomeration of 
more than 2,000 inhabitants living in contiguous 
houses or with not more than 200 metres between 
houses, and communes of which the major part of 
the population is part of a multi-communal agglo­
meration of this nature.
FINLAND. Non-administrative agglomerations, i.e., 
almost all groups of buildings occupied by at 
least 200 people and with usually not more than 
200 metres between houses.
NETHERLANDS. All municipalities with at least 
one population cluster of 5,000 or more inhabi­
tants and other municipalities in which not more 
than 20 per cent of the economically active male 
population is engaged in agriculture.
AUSTRIA. Communes (Gemeinden) of more than 5,000 
inhabitants.
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JAPAN, Urban municipalities (shi and ku of Tokyo- 
to) usually having 30,000 or more inhabitants and 
■which may include some rural area as well as urban 
cluster.
PUERTO RICO. Places of 2,500 or more inhabitants 
and densely settled urban fringes of urbanized 
areas.
VENEZUELA. Urban: Populated centrés (centres
poblados) of 2,500 or more inhabitants. Semi- 
urban: Populated centres (centres poblados) of
1,000-2,499 inhabitants.
CHILE. Populated centres which have definite 
urban characteristics contributed by certain 
public and municipal services.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. All areas of 500 or more 
inhabitants, and adjoining suburban areas, but 
excluding predominantly rural agricultural settle­
ments, temporary villages for construction work 
in rural areas and alluvial diamond diggings; 
well-established towns of fewer than 500 inhabi­
tants but at least approximately 100 white inhab­
itants, and with specified urban characteristics; 
and "rural” portions of certain districts in which 
large metropolitan areas fall and where the per­
centage of the "rural" population is small com­
pared with the urban and a considerable proportion 
of the workers follow urban-type occupations.
YUGOSLAVIA, Localities of 15,000 or more inhabi­
tants; localities of 5,000-14,999 inhabitants of 
which at least 30 per cent are not engaged in 
agriculture ; localities of 3,000-4,999 inhabi­
tants of which at least 70 per cent arc not 
engaged in agriculture ; and localities of 2 ,000- 
2,999 inhabitants of which at least 80 per cent 
are not engaged in agriculture.
COSTA RICA. "Metropolitan area" of San José city 
(excluding rural sector of district of Las Pavas), 
Cartago city, and administrative centres of all 
cantons except San Pablo (province of Heredia), 
Nandayure (province of Guanacaste) and Buenos 
Aires (province of Puntarenas).
PERU, Capitals of districts and those populated cen­
tres with such urban characteristics as streets, plazas, water supply systems, sewerage systems, electric lights, étc.
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BRAZIL. Urban and suburban zones of administra­
tive centres of raunicipios and distritos.
MEXICO. Localities of 2,500 or more inhabitants.
PORTUGAL. Agglomerations of 2,000 or more inhab­
itants (19^0 ).
ECUADOR. Cities, capitals of provinces and cantons 
MOROCCO. 117 urban centres.
MALAYSIA:
Sabah. Towns of 3,000 or more inhabitants, 
i.e., Sandakan, Jesselton, Tawaua, Kudat and 
Victoria (Labuah).
Sarawak. Kuching municipality and towns of
3.000 or more inhabitants, i.e., Siba, Miri, 
Simànggàng, Bintulu, Sarikei and Lutong.
TURKEY. 1955! Administrative centres of provinces 
and districts. I96O: Localities of more than
10.000 inhabitants.
HONDURAS. Localities of 1,000 or more.inhabi­
tants having essentially urban characteristics.
U.A.R. (EGYPT), Cities, including thé five largest 
cities, which are also governorates, and the capi­
tals of provinces and districts.
CEYLON, Municipalities, urban councils, local 
board areas and towns proclaimed under the Births 
and Deaths Registration Ordinance.
EL SALVADOR. Administrative centres of municipios.
PAKISTAN, Municipalities, civil lines, canton­
ments not included within municipal limits, any 
other continuous collection of houses inhabited 
by hot less thàn 5,000 persons and having urban 
characterist ics and aIs o a few areas having urban 
characteristics but fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.
INDIA^ Towns (places with municipal corporation, 
municipal area committee, town committee, notified 
area .committee or cantonment board) ; also, all 
places having 5,000 or more, inhabitants, a density 
of not less than 1,060 pier sons per square mile, 
at least three fourths of thé adult male popula­
tion employed in pursuits other than agriculture 
and pronounced urban characteristics.
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KOREA (s o u t h ), Seoul city and municipalities of
5,000 or more inhabitants (shi),5
United Nations, Demographic Yearbook. 196? 





Crucial to Professor Rostov's theory is the 
implicit notion that distinct, observable changes 
occur between successive development stages which he 
believes nations go through. The "take-off stage" is 
thought by many to be the most original and important 
contribution of his theory.
There has been much comment and criticism of 
Professor Rostov's theory, and of his take-off concept 
in particular, but most of this has been on theoreti­
cal rather than empirical grounds because of the dif­
ficulties associated with testing his theory empirically, 
Most of these theoretical comments have centered 
around the criticism that Rostov's theory is vague 
and that many of his concepts are not rigorously 
enough defined. In addition, it has been argued that 
his theory is based mainly on the experiences of a few 
presently developed .''Western'' nations and, thus, may
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have limited applicability to the nations of the rest 
of the world.
Professor Simon Kuznets has been the central 
figure in examining Professor Rostow's theory empir­
ically and in compiling the work done by others, as a 
supplement to his own work, in this area. The 
approach used by Kuznets, and others, has been to work 
with historical time series covering long periods of 
time for approximately a dozen presently developed 
nations, all "Western" with the exception of Japan. 
Because of data limitations for the early time periods 
examined for these countries, this approach has led to 
results which, while not conclusive, have lent no sup­
port to Professor Rostow's theory and to the implicit 
notion that discrete, observable changes occur as 
nations proceed along the path of economic development.
Approach and Results of the Present Study
The present study, employed a sample consisting 
of a large proportion of the countries in the world 
ranked according to level of economic development.
The ranking used was that developed by Professor Magdi 
M. El-Kaininash because it considered more factors than 
otheîv methods, The 49 countries tanked according to 
level' of economic development in this study contain 
slightly more than half of the world's population,
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while the 46 of these examined in Chapter VI, and the 
47 examined in Chapter VII, of the present study account 
for somewhat more than one third of the world's popu- 
lation.
Rostow's take-off stage is generally understood 
to be a period of about twenty years, and it is per­
haps the most readily testable aspect of his theory. 
United Nations time series data are now available for 
some of the countries in the world for a period of 
seventeen years, or the greater part of the time 
required for Professor Rostow's take-off stage to 
occur.
Previous researchers analyzed long-term his­
torical time series data for approximately a dozen 
presently developed nations to see if support could 
be found for the take-off period concept. In par­
ticular, they attempted to determine if abrupt changes 
in investment proportions occurred during the take-off 
period which distinguished it from the other "stages" 
which nations go through. This method did not support 
Professor Rostow's theory.
The present study carried out a time series 
analysis using available United Nations data for the
Calculated using data from, United Nations, 
Demographic Yearbook, 196? (New York: Statistical
Office of the United Nations, I968).
211
ranking of sample countries selected for examination. 
The major hypothesis examined was that a "cluster" of 
countries at the lower, less developed end of the 
ranking of sample countries would exhibit character­
istics appropriate to Professor Rostow's take-off 
stage.
"Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation as a 
Percentage of Gross Domestic Product" and "Government 
Consumption Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product" were calculated for the sample 
countries for as many years as data were available-- 
17 year spans of data were common, although l4-l6 
year spans of data were used in many cases. A linear 
regression line was fitted to the percentages for each 
country and then extrapolated a sufficient number of 
additional years to yield a 20 year time span.
A 20 year period was chosen for three reasons. 
First, this is a reasonable interpretation of the 
length of time required for Professor Rostow's take­
off stage to occur. Second, with spans of data up to 
1? years in length available, it required, at a mini­
mum, a projection of only three years. Third, pro­
jecting the available data of each of these countries 
to a period totaling 20 years in length led to a "com­
parability" of the change in investment as a percent­
age of product, and in government as a percentage of
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product, for each of these countries because of the 
similarity of time span.
Two of Professor Rostow*s conditions which 
must be fulfilled in order for the take-off stage to 
occur--and which set it apart from the other stages—  
require that there be a rapid increase in investment, 
and of government, as a proportion of a nation's 
economy during the take-off stage.
Although a seemingly large sample of countries 
was examined in the present study, it must be realized 
that this study examined only a brief span of data for 
each of its sample countries (which were ranked accord­
ing to level of economic development) and therefore 
was able to examine only the "stages" that these coun­
tries were in during the span of data examined. Only 
a small proportion of these were in Professor Rostow's 
take-off stage.
A small "cluster" of countries near the bottom 
of the ranking of sample countries showed signs of 
exhibiting Professor Rostow's investment characteris­
tic of the take-off stage. A smaller, and less cer­
tain "cluster" in this area appeared to exhibit his
specified government characteristic. Nevertheless,» V.  ̂ w .
there was not sufficient evidence to determine more 
than a limited probability that these countries were 
in Professor Rostow’s take-off stage.
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Both investment and government as a proportion 
of a nation's economy experienced rapid increases in 
magnitude for some countries near the bottom of those 
in the sample examined, and evidence appeared for a 
.characteristic not mentioned, or hypothesized by Ros­
tov, that the rapid increase in government proportions 
appeared to terminate somewhat later (higher in the 
ranking of countries) than did the rapid increase in 
.investment proportions. The available evidence for 
the sample countries also indicated distinct breaks 
between arbitrarily chosen clusters of countries in 
terms of the rate of increase in investment proportions 
and in government proportions, providing some basis 
for the contention that distinct, observable changes 
occur as cbuntries proceed along the path of increas­
ing economic dévelopment--a necessary requirement 
which must be fulfilled in order for any historical 
stages theory of economic development to be valid.
As a sidelight to this research, several 
lesser aspects of Professor Rostov's theory were 
examined. One of his statements implied that invest- 
ment becomes an increasingly large proportion of a 
nation's economy as it becomes more developed. An 
examination of the ranking of sample countries used 
in the present study indicated this to occur. In 
addition, Rostov stated that as nations become more
2l4
developed a larger percentage of their population 
becomes "urban." An analysis of the sample countries 
showed a positive correlation between the level of a 
country's economic development and the percentage of 
its population living in urban areas.
The present study perhaps has been no more con­
clusive in terms of evaluating Professor Rostow's his­
torical stages theory than previous empirical studies. 
However, in conjunction with these other studies, it 
should serve to broaden the realm of available knowl­
edge in this area. In summary, the present study has 
provided an analysis for a broad sample of countries 
of changes in investment proportions, government 
proportions, and urbanization of population which 




Enke, Stephen, Economics for Development. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Gray, Alexander. The Development of Economic Doctrine. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, I965.
Hagen, Everett E. On the Theory of Social Change: How
Economic Growth Begins. Homewood, Illinois: 
Dorsey Press, I967.
Kuznets, Simon. Economic Growth and Structure:
Selected Essays. New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, I965.
Meier, Gerald Nf. Leading Issues in Development Econom­
ics; Selected Materials and Commentary. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Oser, Jacob. The Evolution of Economic Thought. New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, I963.
Rostow, W. W. (ed.). The Economics of Take-Off into 
Sustained Growth. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1968.
Rostow, W. W, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto. Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, I960.
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics: An Introductory Analysis.
Seventh Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, I967.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. History of Economic Analysis.




Baudet, Henri, and van Stuijvenberg, J. H, "Rostow's 
Theory on Growth." Weltwirtschdftliches 
Archly, Vol. XC, No.”~l ( I963 ) , i>p. 57-?6.
Bauer, P. T., and Wilson, Charles. "The Stages of 
Growth." Economica, New Series, Vol. XXIX 
(May, 1962), pp. 196-200.
Cairncross, A. K. "The Stages of Economic Growth."
Economic History Review. Second Series, Vol. 
XIII, No. 3 (April, 1961), pp. 450-458.
Checkland, S. G. "Theories of Economic and Social
Evolution: The Rostow Challenge." Scottish
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. VII, No. 3 
(November, 1960), pp. 169-193.
El-Kammash, Magdi M. "On the Measurement of Economic 
Development Using Scalogram Analysis." Papers 
and Proceedings of the Regional Science Asso­
ciation. Vol. XI (1963). pp. 309-334.
Fishlow, Albert. "Empty Economic Stages?" Economic
Journal. Vol. LXXV (March, I965), pp. 112-125.
Habakkuk, J. H. "A Review of The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, by ¥. W. 
Rostow." Economic Journal. Vol. LXXI, No. 283 
(September! I96I ), pp. 601-604.
Kant, M. "Rostow's Take-Off: An Appraisal." Indian
Journal of Economics. Vol. XLIII (July, I962),
pp. 27-33.
Kuznets, Simon S. "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic 
Growth of Nations: VI, Long-Term Trends in
Capital Formation Proportions." Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Vol. IX, No. 4, 
Part II (July, I96I), pp. 1-124.
Myrdal, Gunnar. "The Theories of 'Stages of Growth.'"
Scandinavian Economic History Review. Vol. XV, 
Nos. 1 and 2 (l9^?), pp. 1-12.
Ohlin, Goran. "Reflections on the Rostow Doctrine."
Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 
IX, No. 4 (July, 1961), pp. 640-655.
2.18
Parker, William N. "A Review of, The Stages of Eco­
nomie Growth: A Nou-Communist Manifesto, by
W. W. Rostow." American Economic Review, •
Vol. L, No. 5 (December, I960), pp. 1058-1059*
Rostow, W. W. "The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth." 
Economic Journal, Vol. LXVI, No. 26l (March, 
1956), pp. 25-48.
Supple, Barry E. "Has the Early History of Developed 
Countries Any Current Relevance?" American 
Economic Review, Vol. LV (May, I965II pp. 99-
103.
Other Publications
Frank, Andre Gunder. Rostow’s Stages of Economic
Growth throu.gh Escalation to Nuclear Destruc­
tion. Ann Arbor, Michigan; The Radical Edu­
cation Project.
United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 1967. New York: 
Statistical Office of the United Nations, I968.
United Nations. National Accounting Practices in Sixty
Countries: A Supplement to the Yearbook of
National Accounts Statistics. New York: Sta­
tistical Office of the United Nations, 1964.
United Nations. Yearbook of National Accounts Statis­
tics, 1957. New York: Statistical Office of
the United Nations, 1958.
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,
1958. New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, 1959.
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,
1959. New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I96O.
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 
1961» New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I962.
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 
1962. New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I963.
219
• Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 
19d d . New York: Statistical Office of the
United Nations, I967.
• Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 
1967. New York: Statistical Office of the 
United Nations, 1968.
